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Anotace
Pra´ce ukazuje, zˇe k proble´mu vztahu teˇla a mysli, a konkre´tneˇ k
ota´zce vysveˇtlitelnosti veˇdomı´ prˇ´ırodn´ımi veˇdami, je trˇeba prˇistu-
povat skrze zkouma´n´ı jazyka a vy´znamu. Za ja´dro proble´mu vz-
tahu teˇla a mysli je oznacˇena kantovska´ transcendenta´ln´ı jed-
nota apercepce a je zd˚urazneˇn rozd´ıl mezi empiricky´m a tran-
scendenta´ln´ım veˇdomı´m. Prˇedpokla´da´ se, zˇe empiricke´ veˇdomı´
je uspokojiveˇ vysveˇtlitelne´ pomoc´ı teorie mysˇlenek vysˇsˇ´ıho rˇa´du.
Na´sleduje rozbor r˚uzny´ch aspekt˚u vy´znamu, intencionality a uzˇit´ı
jazyka, ktere´ podporuj´ı za´veˇr, zˇe podmı´nky mozˇnosti by´ti mluv-
cˇ´ım jazyka s sebou nesou transcendenta´ln´ı podmı´nky veˇdomı´. O
jazyku lze tak rˇ´ıci, zˇe konstituuje veˇdomı´ nejen v tom smyslu, zˇe
krite´ria prˇipsa´n´ı veˇdomı´ neˇcˇemu (neˇkomu) jsou ve sve´ podstateˇ
jazykova´, ale te´zˇ ve smyslu, zˇe veˇdomı´ se objevuje se schopnost´ı
mluvit.
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Abstract
The thesis proposes to address the mind-body problem, and specif-
ically the question of scientific explanation of consciousness, in
terms of language and meaning. First, the core of the mind-
problem is identified with Kant’s transcendental unity of apper-
ception and the distinction between empirical and transcendental
consciousness is emphasized. Empirical consciousness, as con-
sciousness of something, is assumed to be best approached by
a higher-order theory of consciousness. Then various aspects of
meaning, intentionality and language in use are discussed to pre-
pare ground for the conclusion that transcendental conditions
of consciousness are entailed by conditions of being a genuine
speaker of language. Thus language can be said to be constitutive
consciousness not only in the sense that the behavioural criteria
for attributing consciousness are essentially linguistic, but also in
the sense that consciousness comes with the ability to speak.
keywords: consciousness, language, meaning, concepts, inten-
tionality, transcendental selfconsciousness, mind-body problem
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6 1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The mind-body problem seems to be the center of the philosophy of mind
around which most of its issues revolve. Despite its long tradition, the phi-
losophy of mind has faced a great challenge caused by the practical and
explanatory success of natural sciences. Various aspects of the mind have
undergone scientific scrutiny - sometimes to considerable success, other times
to almost no success at all. Results and methods of empirical research have
exerted pressure on philosophers and theorists to specify what the mind ac-
tually is, what is to be explained. Ingenious metaphysical theories have been
developed either to conform to both “hard” scientific facts and our reflective
investigation of the mind, or to show, by speculation or conceptual analysis of
the mind, that contemporary scientific knowledge is not sufficient for a viable
explanation of the mind. Thus today the philosophy of mind is enriched with
concepts like supervenience, property dualism, physicalism, emergentism, re-
ductionism etc. Perhaps too much of philosophical effort has been devoted
to conceptual analyses to the desired effect that consciousness is in principle
inexplicable in scientific terms. I am convinced, and I will not argue further
for this belief as I find it a fundamental one, that consciousness is a natural
phenomenon. It follows then that it is itself an empirical matter whether the
mind-body relation will be satisfactorily explained by science. We should not
claim now that it cannot be explained, even if we were quite confident that
contemporary scientific knowledge does not comprise concepts appropriate
for the explanation of some aspects of the mind, for the scientific paradigm
is ready to change with any groundbreaking discovery. And if it is to be
found out that some crucial question about the mind cannot be answered
due to practical or physical limits then again it is not a conceptual but an
empirical matter that consciousness cannot be explained scientifically.
1.1 Outline
In general, the point of this thesis is to argue that in the attempt to naturalize
consciousness the focus should be on the use of language. The fundamental
idea behind the point, which is not original, is that language is constitutive
of consciousness. What follows is an attempt to clarify the relation between
language and consciousness so that the idea of constitution makes better
sense. I begin with arguing against an influential tendency in the philosophy
of mind which takes it as an essential feature of consciousness that there
be a certain feel to conscious experience. I argue that appealing to feels
or what-it-is-likeness is incoherent and so it cannot support the claim that
consciousness is irreducible to brain processes or anything else that science
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can describe. I do not think, however, that rejecting the notion of what-it-
is-likeness makes consciousness easier to explain. I identify the core of the
so-called Hard problem of the mind-body relation with Kant’s transcendental
unity of apperception, which, despite its structural and functional specifica-
tion, is still hard to account for. Subsequently, I argue that the conceptual,
which is the ‘medium’ of judgements, is inextricably linked to the linguistic,
and hence that the best way to learn about the possible foundation of the
transcendental unity of apperception is by looking at the linguistic.
I continue with some remarks on the nature of the conceptual and I argue
that, despite its tight link to the linguistic, it is a concept worth keeping in the
philosophical vocabulary. Afterwards, I turn to the discussion of the principle
of compositionality. Though the principle originally applies to meanings of
linguistic expressions, I argue that an analogous principle has to be supposed
to work in human understanding if productivity of our thinking is to be
explained.
In section 4 I finally discuss three different approaches to the nature of
intentionality and meaning which, according to J. Haugeland, cover for all
positive accounts of these philosophical concepts. Haugeland labels the ap-
proaches neo-cartesianism, neo-behaviourism and neo-pragmatism. Works of
major proponents of each of the approaches are then discussed in more detail
in order to look for observations that might contribute to our understand-
ing of the relation between language and consciousness. A parallel result is
that one’s semantics strongly constrains one’s theory of mind and vice versa,
which again supports the idea that the attempt to explain consciousness
should begin with explaining the linguistic capacity. The selected propo-
nents are J. Fodor, D. Dennett and R. Brandom respectively. I do not come
up with a synthetic interpretation that would unite bits and pieces from each
of the theories. I arrive at the conclusion that Fodor’s approach is likely to
be misdirected, though I appreciate that his theory makes it clearer than
the others, due to strong ontological commitments entailed in computation-
alism, what is to be done to explain rational thinking or human mindedness1
- find the right program the execution of which produces rational sequence
of thoughts. Dennett’s theory contributes mainly to the explanation of em-
pirical consciousness, and little can be inferred about what Kant would call
transcendental consciousness from his works. Unsurprisingly, it is Brandom’s
philosophy, which explicitly elaborates Kantian themes, that may offer some
insights into the linguistic foundation of the transcendental unity of apper-
1Fodor carefully avoids speaking of consciousness. His explanatory effort is aimed ‘only’
at rational thinking, which he understands as a sequence of various propositional attitudes
to mental contents.
8 1 INTRODUCTION
ception. That is the topic of the last section, where it is concluded that
transcendental conditions of consciousness are entailed in the conditions of
being a speaker.
To make it clear, the thesis does not design a theory of consciousness.
Its main purpose is to support the idea (and specify its sense) that language
is constitutive of consciousness. No doubt, language may be constitutive of
consciousness in other senses as well. I have chosen the transcendental view
because I find it the right way to approach the Hard problem; even though
I realize that by plunging into the Kantian paradigm I run a greater risk of
misunderstanding than in others.
1.2 Some ontological remarks about the mind
Although I believe that the subsequent treatment of the topic is not bound to
a specific metaphysics of mind, some of the claims about the mind that I take
for granted in this thesis betray commitment to what could be considered
an Aristotelian. According to this view, the soul (the mind)2 is the form
of the body in much the same way as a house-like structure is the form
that makes a mass of bricks, mortar and beams a house.3 Thus strictly
speaking, human being is a compound of the body and the invigorating mind;
and these are inseparable from one another as a house-shape is inseparable
from the material which fills it out. However, for the specifc purpose of
elucidation of the mind-body relation I can afford to take such expressions at
face value, leaving aside most of the problems of hylomorphic metaphysics,
and emphasise only those threads of the Aristotelian framework that are
congenial with my view.
First, the framework provides a useful direction how to look at the prob-
lem of the unity of the mind and the body. The mind and the body can
be regarded as identical or different in the same sense as the wax and its
shape. If platonic dualism is considered to be the right metaphysics, one
could interpret forms as entities that are somehow conferred to the matter in
the world of appearances and whose existence is independent of the matter.
Thus the mind would be a things distinct from the body, as the Cartesian du-
alism holds. If materialism is considered to be the right metaphysics, forms
of complex things, such as human beings, could be interpreted as reducible
to structure of the matter which consists of nothing but elementary particles
2While Aristotle conceived of the soul as the unity of various faculties, i.e. nutrition,
perception and mind, we may substitute “the mind” (in the contemporary sense) for “the
soul” for the purpose of elucidating a specific view of the mind-body relation. Thus the
conception is Aristotelian in a very relaxed sense.
3The parallel as well as the general overview is taken from [Shields(2000)].
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(whose ‘form’ is fundamental) and their relations (presumably spatiotempo-
ral). Thus minds would be results of complex material organization. The
crucial advantage of the Aristotelian framework is recognizing the mind as
that what essentially makes some material body a human being - and it is
a further question whether (or in what sense) it implies that minds must be
distinct from bodies or not.
Second, the sense in which the mind is the form of the body of a human
being is functional. As a mass of bricks and beams is a house only if it
serves the function of a shelter appropriate for living in, so the body is a
living human being only if it thinks, perceives, acts rationally, etc. Thus the
mind can be described in terms of what it does, rather than how its working
is realized. Admittedly, this is an expression of functionalism in its broad
sense; and I take it as another fundamental belief for which I will not argue
in the thesis. A corollary is that minds can be conceived of only as embodied
if rational agency is deemed to be part of the functional specification. So the
famous arguments that computers cannot think or be conscious, which are to
support claims about some sort of irreducibility of the mind to the body, are
aimed, so to speak, at a too easy target, for ordinary computers lack interest
in the world upon which they would like to act.4 Thus for something to
exhibit ‘mindedness’, it must not only be able to exhibit certain cognitive
faculties on demand (that is: interact with environment), but it must also
have a goal that it could try to achieve by rational behaviour. Perhaps, the
range of goals upon which someone acts constrains what it is to be a human
with equal strength as the range of faculties used in achieving the goals.
Now, one could argue that endorsing functionalism is a controversial step,
because it greatly simplifies the whole issue of consciousness and intentional-
ity by disregarding some purportedly essential questions. I don’t think this
hypothetical objection is quite right, for it is usually aimed at functionalism
in the narrow sense, which is a doctrine about the nature of mental states.
Though functionalism in the broad sense, as a doctrine about the nature of
the mind, is still a view that some theorists would find controversial, it is a
view compatible with the scientific paradigm, unlike the Cartesian dualism,
for example. Now, since it is generally agreed by most theorists that minds
are natural phenomena and that scientific approach is the most fruitful one
in explaining nature, it ought to be supposed, as a null hypothesis, that the
functionalist view of the mind is adequate. Of course, an argument against
functionalism in the broad sense is likely to be based on analyses of the sci-
entific paradigm as such, with the conclusion that it lacks some concepts
necessary for an adequate explanation of the mind. But as I have argued
4Cf. [Searle(1990)].
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above, I do not think such analyses are sound, because if minds are natural
phenomenam then the possibility of their explanation is not a conceptual
matter.
Finally, I don’t think that the Aristotelian threads I have chosen to follow
are incompatible with the Kantian theme adopted below. Roughly speaking,
the Aristotelian view provides a framework for empirical conception of the
mind-body relation, whereas the Kantian paradigm shows the preconditions
of ‘mindedness’, which may, or may not, invite an empirical explanation.
Hopefully, it does make sense to detach the Aristotelian view of the mind
from Aristotle’s metaphysics, and also to follow Kant’s transcendental con-
siderations about consciousness without endorsing the doctrine of transcen-
dental idealism.
2 Shifting the Hard problem
If the mind-body problem is really central to the contemporary studies of the
mind, what is the essence of the problem? Why do we still talk about the
mind-body problem if there are but a few philosophers willing to conceive of
the mind and the body as of two different substances? Although many people
are inclined to think of the body and the mind as a special kind of unity and
hence want to abandon the Cartesian framework, in which the core of the
problem is intersubstantial causation, we still have no generally accepted idea
how to conceive the unity. However, we should not conclude too hastily that
the gap between the body and the mind is merely conceptual. Although most
of the arguments against the prospect of science to explain the mind make
use of the apparent incompatibility of the concepts used for describing the
mental and the physical, they often go one step further, arguing that such
conceptual incompatibility indicates some sort of metaphysical difference.
David Chalmers presents the argument from incompatibility (also known as
the explanatory argument) as follows:
(1) Physical accounts explain at most structure and function.
(2) Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain conscious-
ness.
(3) No physical account can explain consciousness.5
5[Chalmers(2003), p. 103].
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While we may accept the first premise without serious objections, we
must ask on what ground the second one is justified. According to Chalmers,
who follows an idea originally expressed by Thomas Nagel in his influential
paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, structure and function alone cannot
explain experience, which is a defining feature of consciousness.6 Experience
is, according to Chalmers, what makes the problem of the scientific account
of consciousness really hard:
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experi-
ence. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-
processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974)
has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism.
This subjective aspect is experience. [Chalmers(1995), p. 3]
In this section, I would like to 1) specify what Chalmers’s (and Nagel’s
respectively) notion of experience amounts to; 2) show that this notion of
experience is either too vague or incoherent for the demand of its scientific
explanation to be reasonable; 3) argue that a meaningful explanation of
consciousness need not account for the intuition behind that notion of what-
it-is-likeness; 4) suggest that the hard problem be shifted from experience to
meaning.
2.1 The Hard problem
In order not to just change names for the problematic domain, Chalmers
tries to pin down what he means by experience:
Human beings have subjective experience: there is something it
is like to be them. We can say that a being is conscious in this
sense - or is phenomenally conscious, as it is sometimes put - when
there is something it is like to be that being.7 [Chalmers(2003),
p. 103]
6It is no coincidence that consciousness attracts most of the attention when it comes
to arguments about the possibility of scientific explanation of the mind. Consciousness
is an aspect of human mind that makes the mind-body problem hard. No other aspect
of mind, such as memory, perception etc., is considered irreducible. Thus the mind-body
problem seems to ‘reduce’ to the consciousness-body problem.
7Other versions of the definition ([Nagel(1974)], [Chalmers(1995)]) read ‘organism’ in-
stead of ‘being’. I think it is an unjustified restriction since the what-it-is-likeness is
presented as both a sufficient and necessary condition of consciousness, hence it should
pick out conscious beings even under universal quantification. Why not limit the definition
even further, for example: “a higher mammal is conscious if . . . ”? Clearly, the restriction
to organisms only is motivated by a tacit assumption that anorganic compounds do not
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For the sake of analytical clarity, it is usually accompanied by a definition
of the conscious mental state, because consciousness is predicated not only to
beings but to mental states as well. Analogically, a mental state is conscious
iff there is something it is like to be in that state. This something Chalmers
and Nagel refer to is technically called quale or phenomenal property. Since
Chalmers evidently wants to employ the criterion of what-it-is-likeness in
the original Nagel’s sense, I will refer in the following discussion to Nagel’s
statements mainly. Nagel’s formulation is:
[A]n organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is
something that it is like to be that organism - something it is like
for the organism. [Nagel(1974)]
The ontological commitment implied by the quoted definition, which is
not accidental as there are many other expressions in Nagel’s and Chalmers’s
articles bearing the same commitment, demands to treat qualia as real things,
or at least to adopt a factualist stance about phenomenal properties. Thus
the logical form of the quoted conditional is most naturally read as:
∀x ( ∃y (Q(x,y)) ↔ C(x)); x is ‘C’onscious iff there is y that is ‘Q’uale
of x - its what-it-is-likeness.
There is nothing strange in what-it-is-likeness being taken as a relational
predicate, since qualia are from the beginning construed as felt qualities of
something. According to this logical form, unless ‘Q’ is a reflexive relation (it
cannot be, intuitively, a symmetrical relation), qualia cannot be conscious,
but that does not necessarily violate our intuitions, for qualia are felt objects,
and though we may be conscious of them, they themselves are not conscious.
To conclude this analytical nit-picking, let’s reserve the term ‘qualia’ to y’s
and let the predicate ‘Q’ be called what-it-is-likeness.
Since we know (empirically) that there are conscious organisms, we have
invited qualia to our metaphysical garden by this conditional. To be is to be
the value of a (bound) variable. It will be first argued that this introduction
of qualia among basic metaphysical categories is highly problematic due to
uncertain criteria of identity. Afterwards, it will be explored whether pos-
tulating qualia is really necessary for the explanatory argument to work, or
more generally, whether Chalmers’s intuition turns out to be void if we hold
a non-factualist position about phenomenal properties.
sense anything and hence there cannot by anything it is like to be them. I think this is an
unjustified assumption.
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2.1.1 Identifying qualia
Why is it untenable that qualia are to be considered real? Because we do
not have any criteria of their identity that would make them what they are
supposed to be. What are qualia supposed to be? D. C. Dennett, who
steadfastly argues against the usage of the notion in the philosophy of mind,
recognizes four characteristic features of qualia, based on works of their pro-
ponents.8 They are: 1) ineffable, 2) intrinsic, 3) private and 4) directly or
immediately apprehensible in consciousness. This analysis is in accord with
Nagel’s usage, for his argument to the conclusion that we may never know
what it is like to be a bat makes use of all of them.9 I find it unnecessary to
elaborate more the concept of quale, because for the sake of my argument,
the present outline is enough; besides, as Dennett observes, there is no clearer
definition of the concept and its sense is usually evoked by examples.10
Why do we need criteria of identity in order to consider a thing real? It
is a reasonable methodological regulative which says that one may introduce
a new type of object to a theory11 if she can provide it with such criteria
(which ought to be stated in terms of the yet unextended theory). Thus
mathematicians may introduce fractions as a
b
=df
c
d
↔ b · c = a · d, where
there are already familiar expressions in the definiens. Similarly, physicists
may introduce black holes, electrons or strings, provided they say how these
objects manifest themselves in a way that can be observed. Identity criteria
delimit a thing out of the whole universum, by telling us what makes the
thing being that what it is (and not something else). Now, one could well
accept this methodological regulative for theoretical terms and still deny its
relevance for the term ‘quale’ because it is not a theoretical term, unlike
“fraction” or “atom”. After all, “quale” is to denote the very quality of
our mental states which is the basis of all our judgements about identity
(something like sense-data or raw intuitions), since the identity criteria of
any theoretical object (except for the ideal theoretical objects like numbers)
8See [Dennett(1988)].
9They are intrinsic because they are real and irreducible to extrinsic properties of
mental states; they are ineffable because otherwise the possibility of knowing what it is
like to be a bat would be open (all it takes is teaching the bat, or another being using
echolocation, how to describe it); they are apprehensible in consciousness because they
are defined as “felt qualities”; and finally, they are private because they are supposed to
be the residue of a mental state when it is stripped of every overt manifestation, they are
the intrinsic qualities of my mental states.
10Ibid.
11Note that ‘quale’ is a philosophical term that belongs to metaphysics of mind; and
metaphysics is a theory sui generis. The whole idea comes, of course, from Quine’s “No
entity without identity.”
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must be ultimately stated in terms of observables12 that themselves have no
deeper epistemic foundation (otherwise an infinite regress would occur). So,
the argument would go, we must rely on our ability to discern qualia without
knowing their identity criteria, for otherwise we could not even make sense
of judging whether some observable conditions are fulfilled.13
The outcome of the previous hypothetical discussion is that the require-
ment of identity criteria for qualia may be too strong, for they may not be
merely theoretical objects. They are theoretical insofar they are stipulated
as a part of the explanandum in the mind-body problem, and they are not
theoretical insofar they are experienced. Remember, however, that the prob-
lem addressed by the explanatory argument is theoretical, not experiential: I
do feel something but I do not know how to isolate the felt quality itself; and
that seems to be necessary if we are to try to explain it in scientific terms.
Therefore identity criteria are still relevant. Imagine somebody wanted you
to explain something you cannot recognize. Explain THIS! What? Well,
THIS thing I am referring to. Ok, my explanation of THIS is . . . (if THIS is
what you referred to). No, you have explained THAT, but not THIS. How
am I to know?14
Let me finally turn attention to showing why qualia lack identity criteria.
Actually, all we need is to consider Wittgenstein’s argument against private
language. Given the salient features of qualia mentioned above, especially
privateness and ineffability, it seems to be clear that the possibility of private
language goes hand in hand with the possibility of identity criteria.
§258. Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a
diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I
associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar
for every day on which I have the sensation. – I will remark first
of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. – But
still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. – How? Can
I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak,
or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my
12At least so in the empiricist paradigm which I have taken over from the whole discus-
sion about qualia.
13This hypothetical counterargument is, I think, wrong, though it is far from obvious.
It rests on a wrong assumption about cognition inherent to empiricism (the Myth of the
Given) that was revealed by W. Sellars in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.
Anyway, it is charitable enough to grant a fallacious argument to a hypothetical opponent.
14It might be rightly objected that theorists dealing with the qualia do understand what
is to be explained, since even some neurophysiologists have recognized qualia as forming
the hard problem. What they recognize, however, as the desideratum of their theories is
not an account of particular qualia but of subjectivity in general.
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attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.
– But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be!
A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. –
Well, that is done precisely by the concentration of my attention;
for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the
sign and the sensation. – But “I impress it on myself” can only
mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion
right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion
of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem
right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk
about ‘right’. [Wittgenstein(1953)]
One of the many things this paragraph shows is that the reality of how
things seem to us is not independent of our judgements about how they seem.
As Dennett likes to put it, there is no real seeming. Wittgenstein claims that
saying “I know I am in pain.” violates the grammar of the verb “to know” as
ordinarily used, at least if I thereby mean something more than just “I am
in pain.” Thus the best sense Wittgenstein can give to the beforementioned
expression is that it does not make sense to doubt the occurence of one’s
own feelings.15 In the Wittgensteinian sense, where there is no possibility of
a mistake, there can be no knowledge either. Consequently, we do not find out
what we feel, we simply report what we feel. However subtle the difference
may seem, its consequences are important. For as Wittgenstein says when
he replies to a hypothetical accusation of behaviourism, our expressions of
feelings do not denote special objects, but they express them.16 It is helpful
to recall the famous beetle-in-the-box analogy. If we maintained that verbal
expressions of feelings do denote some things everyone is familiar with only
from their own case (this satisfies the delineation of qualia), then
[s]uppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a
“beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone
says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. –
Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something
different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing con-
stantly changing. – But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in
these people’s language? – If so it would not be used as the name
of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-
game at all; not even as a something : for the box might even be
15Cf. [Wittgenstein(1953), §246].
16Cf. [Wittgenstein(1953), §244].
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empty. – No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it
cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression
of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the ob-
ject drops out of consideration as irrelevant.[Wittgenstein(1953),
§293]
The last remark reflects Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialist approach to lan-
guage. We should not expect that language works in the same fashion no
matter what language-game we actually play. Thus the grammar of words
like “table”, “stone” may not be the same as that of “love”, “pain” or “anx-
iety”, even though they are all substantives and often appear in sentences
with identical surface structure. Surely, Wittgenstein’s account is susceptible
to critique, especially when taken positively rather than negatively, but let
me conclude, for the time being, that expressions of feelings do not neces-
sarily acquire their meaning by naming something we are intimate with, i.e.
qualia.
A defender of the concept of quale could now reply: allright, you’ve just
brought Wittgenstein’s argument to the conclusion that our language-game
‘Feel it – Report it’ can be played independently of what it is, but why
could not words like “pain” or “itch” denote something once the usage of
the words is settled by practice? That means: after a child learns to report
“I am in pain.” instead of crying, it nevertheless comes to know what pain
is because the word helps it to hold the content (the quasidenoted quale)
fixed. After all, it would not report pain consistently if the reported thing
were not constant. Hence, the quale is that what induces the report. Well,
is the defender better off? This argument suggests that identity criteria are
stated in terms of identical reports, i.e. identical verbal expressions. Note the
emphasized assumption in the last but one sentence: taking it as a matter
of fact whether the reported thing is constant presupposes there are identity
criteria. It means, effectively, that we need criteria of consistency in usage,
other than just stipulating the reported thing constant (for in that case the
reality of qualia would directly depend on our judgements, and hence qualia
would not be intrinsic properties of our mental states). What could those
consistency criteria be? Presumably, the consistency of the usage is judged
by the language community that teaches it. And this is ultimately done on
the basis of observable and hence non-private facts, viz. Wittgenstein’s dis-
cussion of when we say that somebody knows how to continue an arithmetical
series.
Wittgenstein notes, in the quoted paragraph, that the thing in the box,
the beetle, could be even constantly changing or the box might be empty.
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Were the box labelled “consciousness” instead of “beetle”, this might express
the familiar idea that at some level of our minds there is a united ‘stream
of conscious contents’. I think it is the unity of the stream (consciousness)
which underlies most of the appeals to and intuitions about some quality of
experience that is hard to explain. But the unity is a quality of consciousness
as a whole, whereas qualia are qualities of mental states, i.e. of differentiated
contents of consciousness. The previous discussion has hopefully shown that
the type-identity of linguistic expressions does not ensure the identity of
intrinsic quality which is supposed to be part and parcel of what induces the
subject to report this rather than that. Furthermore, if mental states, qua
Kantian judgements, are differentiated by their conceptual structure, we still
cannot be sure that the quality that accompanies each type of mental state is
the same, unless it is stipulated that identical conceptualization occurs only
if the quality of experience is identical. And if a defender of qualia stipulated
the quale to be identical for every type of mental state then qualia would
not be inexplicable by structure and function only, since the proponents of
qualia would admit, as far as I know, that the content of a mental state
(which governs its identity and under the stipulation also the identity of
qualia) can be functionally analyzed.
The last option for a defender of qualia seems to be appealing to a sort
of intuition. Do we not know what it is like to see red (unlike green, for
example), and could we not find out that the quale is identical simply by
concentration? Not quite, for concentrating one’s attention does not work as
ostension, which is mentioned in the already quoted §258.17 Anyway, the de-
fender may still claim she ‘simply knows’ what quale she is experiencing, but
since it is by definition ineffable, she cannot describe it in more details. How-
ever, there are facts about qualia and some of these facts can be articulated.18
If we had intuitive access to the identity of felt qualities, then there should
be no controversy about such simple facts as “These two qualia are identi-
cal.” Such a controversy occurs, however, in respect to the change-blindness
phenomenon which occurs when a subject of an experiment is watching an
image a part of which is changing, but the subject is not aware of any change.
The change can be either gradual (e.g. the background color slowly changes
to another) or abrupt, with a short mask between the two images. Since the
subject is not aware of the change, she believes she is in the same mental
state as before. The question that invites controversial answers is whether
17And even if it worked as external ostension, the general problem of ostensive definition
would arise: in order to recognize what is pointed at, we would already have to know the
grammar of the introduced term. And if we were to know it, would the definition get any
further than the stipulation “qualia are qualities of mental states”?
18Cf. [Nagel(1974), pp.393,396].
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the qualia are identical before and after the change, or whether they are dif-
ferent, even though the subject does not notice. The latter option seems to
be untenable from the start, since if qualia could change without a notice,
we have no special epistemic access to them, which contradicts the original
assumption of proponents of qualia. Regarding the first option, it is hard
to find other reason for holding the qualia identical than that the subject
thinks the images are identical. Either way, the very fact that defenders of
qualia are not unanimous about the answer suggests the concept of quale is
too vague to be allowed as a part of the explanandum.
Taking the argument against qualia a bit further (to a final stand, I dare-
say), we can claim that qualia, as they are intended by their proponents,
cannot be empirically real in the Kantian sense. Qualia are said to be ineffa-
ble qualities of experience, hence they are not conceptualized. As such, qualia
cannot be known by us, for empirical knowledge is a synthesis of sensibility
and understanding which imposes concepts on intuitions of the former.19 I
take qualia in their intended meaning to be, in Kantian terms, very close to
pure intuitions. Yet every conscious being allegedly knows what it is like to
be it. Are we supposed to allow for a special kind of non-conceptual knowl-
edge (if we wanted to pursue a charitable interpretation of qualia)? We can
readily dismiss knowledge-how as a proper candidate, since there is no prac-
tical employment of that knowledge to think of. So, perhaps knowledge by
acquaintance? “I know what it feels like being in pain, because I felt pain.”
However, this is not an expression of knowledge proper but rather a claim of
the ability to categorize various sensations under different concepts. Knowl-
edge by acquaintance is thus not knowledge of some quality but recognition
of something as the thing it is (and not something else) and, by the same
token, the ability to recognize it as identical in future. Being acquainted
with a feeling does not amount to knowing its quality (which is, probably,
supposed to be the matter thanks to which the feeling is recognized as such
and such), but to be able to discern it as such among other feelings. For-
tunately (and necessarily), we are able to discern things even if we cannot
articulate on what ground we do so. This happens in the process in which
intuitions are brought under concepts. If we could specify the ground of the
recognition, it would mean we have already discerned parts that the original
19What if the proponents of qualia argued that knowledge of what it is like to be oneself
is not supposed to be empirical but rather a priori? We could answer that Kant gave an
account of what it is like to be a man when he stated the necessary features and conditions
of experience. But that is not ineffable at all. And it would be wrong to retaliate that
perhaps some bat-like Kant could equally specify the character of bat experience, for
Kant’s account was not limited to experience of man as a species but to experience in
general (though as intelligible to us).
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thing depends on.20 So either we know some qualities of certain feelings, and
then the qualities are intersubjectively understandable, since they are nec-
essarily conceptualized, or we do not know, in the proper sense, the quality
of a feeling, we simply feel it.21 Once again we come to the conclusion that
qualia cannot be known because they cannot be conceived of – only ‘felt’.
This time, however, we may exclude them (though only in Kantian frame-
work) from the domain of empirically real things, since they can never be
objects of experience.
At the end of this section, I would like to emphasize that the previous
disqualification of qualia (as some intrinsic qualities of experience) does not
mean we do not feel anything or that feelings are completely reducible to
behaviour. It only means that reification of the non-conceptual character of
experience is utterly inappropriate and that the concept of quale is therefore
an idle wheel in the philosophy of mind and in any empirical theory whatso-
ever. Wittgenstein comments on it, rather cryptically though, as follows:
§304 “But you will surely admit that there is a difference
between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour
without any pain?” – Admit it? What greater difference could
there be? – “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion
that the sensation itself is a nothing.” – Not at all. It is not a
something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only
that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about
which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar
which tries to force itself on us here. [Wittgenstein(1953)]
Qualia cannot be accounted for not only by science but by any other
means pretending to aim at knowledge.
2.2 Transcendental self-consciousness
Coming back to our starting point, namely the explanatory argument, is
there any other candidate feature of consciousness that would justify the
second premise? There is a feature that many appeal to in an attempt at
an ultimate argument for the irreducibility of consciousness: all experience
is united in a single point of view that is by the same token aware of itself.
20The arguments is essentially the same as Sellars argument against the Myth of the
Given.
21Throughout the argument I used a specific feeling of pain instead of general what-it-
is-likeness of being a man which is employed in Chalmer’s definition of consciousness. I
did so mainly for clearer illustration and I am convinced that if the argument holds for a
specific feeling, it a fortiori holds for the general what-it-is-likeness.
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Let us first remind ourselves of the intuition supporting the idea of self-
consciousness as an irreducible feature. C. McGinn, for example, wonders:
“How could the aggregation of millions of individually insentient neurons
generate subjective awareness?”22 In the rest of the article McGinn argues
that even though brain is the causal basis of consciousness, we may never
understand the link because it is cognitively closed to us. Indeed, there seems
to be an insurmountable conceptual gap between neuroscientific account of
brain states and phenomenological account of mental states and subjectivity
in general. The crux of the divide seems to be perspectiveness – while empir-
ical sciences investigate their objects within causal order, looking for general
laws governing transition from causes to effects, phenomenology23 conceives
of its objects as necessarily linked to a particular perspective or point of view.
How could perspectiveless physical parts form a perspectival whole uniting
different mental states? This appears to be beyond our understanding.
If one is convinced of causal dependence of consciousness on brain states,
it is natural to look for a place in the brain that provides for this perspec-
tiveness – a kind of bottleneck through which every afferent signal must pass
in order for one to be conscious of it, a Cartesian pineal gland, the embodi-
ment of the self. Natural and tempting as it may be, it is pointless, as D. C.
Dennett convincingly shows in his Consciousness Explained and elsewhere.
Not only is it logically fallacious, he argues, to assume there is a Cartesian
theatre in which the self is watching presented percepts and thereby becomes
conscious of them, but it can also be empirically refuted that there be a spe-
cific part of the brain responsible for turning unconscious information into
conscious one.24
2.2.1 Kantian variations on consciousness
Kant provided us with a particularly suitable account of the problematic
feature of consciousness, usually referred to as “transcendental unity of ap-
perception”. It is suitable for it allows to clearly distinguish between what
we can call empirical and transcendental self-consciousness. Empirical self-
consciousness consists of inner experience of oneself as an appearing object,
i.e. it arises upon conceptualizing intuitions of one’s inner states. Such self-
consciousness is no knowledge of a thing in itself, it is knowledge of how we
appear to ourselves, to phrase it in Kantian terms. The related concept of
an empirical self has much in common, I think, with Hume’s bundle self, for
Kant remarks that empirical consciousness is “by itself dispersed and with-
22[McGinn(1989)].
23I thereby mean any reflective account of mental states or consciousness in general.
24For the detailed argument see [Dennett(1991)].
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out relation to the identity of the subject.”25 Concerning the mind-body
problem, the empirical self-consciousness seems to be no greater mystery
than consciousness of any outer object. Intentional structure of both inner
and outer experience is the same, so the sole difference between them is the
special status of the object to which properties and features perceived in in-
ner experience are ascribed, namely the (empirical) self or person (with its
history, character etc.). If we grant that AI researchers can, in the relevant
sense, make machines (such as Mars probes) aware of their surroundings in
which they can indentify distinct objects, we should easily concede the pos-
sibility of awareness of their internal states, which they do in fact keep track
of for self-preserving purposes.
Transcendental self-consciousness, on the other hand, is of entirely differ-
ent nature. The meaning of the term “transcendental unity of apperception”
may be elucidated by Kant’s well-known expression that “it must be possible
for the “I think” to accompany all my representations, if they are to be any-
thing to me.”26 That is, the united manifold of representations presupposes
transcendental self-consciousness that implicitly relates all representations to
one subject.27
The attribute ‘transcendental’ signifies that the term refers to conditions
for the possibility of experience in general and of empirical self-consciousness
in particular. Kant explains it as follows:
The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective con-
dition of all cognition, not merely something I myself need in or-
der to cognize an object but rather something under which every
intuition must stand in order to become an object for me, since
in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold would
not be united in one consciousness. [Kant(1781), B 138]
P. F. Strawson elaborates the idea behind the term:
[I]f different experiences are to belong to a single consciousness,
there must be the possibility of self -consciousness on the part of
the subject of those experiences. It must be one and the same
understanding which is busy at its conceptualizing work on all
the intuitions belonging to a single consciousness, and it must
be possible for this identity to be known to the subject of these
experiences.28
25[Kant(1781), B 133]
26[Strawson(1966), p. 93].
27Cf. [Kant(1781), B 132].
28[Strawson(1966), p. 93].
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Strawson then traces and supplements Kant’s findings on the transcen-
dental self-consciousness in a way that yields many conclusions worthy of
our attention. Since my aim here is not to present an accurate account of
Kant’s view of the matter, but rather to isolate the sense of consciousness
relevant for our discussion of the Hard-problem, I will only make a list of the
characterics which give a clearer view on the meaning of the technical term.
1. If it is to be possible for the “I think” to accompany all representations,
it is necessary that the order and connectedness of experiences is recog-
nized as different from the order of the objective29 world. That means
that only thanks to the distinction of the subjective and the objective
order can I recognize myself as one possible experiential route among
others, one track of point of view of the objective world. The distinc-
tion itself is possible only if one can get something wrong in perception
of the objective world. Otherwise it might never occur to me that I
am not a god-like consciousness affected by other things than my own
states.30
2. “In the synthetic original unity of apperception I am conscious of my-
self not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I
am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition.”31 Therefore,
the transcendental self-consciousness cannot be an object of experi-
ence. Furthermore, the content of such a thought of self-consciousness
is general: it is about consciousness as such, not about the particular
(empirical) consciousness individuated by particular experiences.
3. The “I” in the “I think” of the transcendental unity of apperception to
which experiences are ascribed bears no criteria of identity, as it makes
no sense to doubt to whom this or that experience occurs. However, the
“I” acquires specific referent thanks to one’s body, which is an object of
outer sense, being the means of identification of selves in interpersonal
communication. Thus it is because I am involved in communication
with other people, to whom I wish to convey my stance and in whose
eyes I am identified with specific object of outer sense (my body), that
my representation of the “I” has a specific referent instead of a general
concept of the subject.32
29“Objective” in Kantian sense, i.e. as an order of appearances of objects of outer
experience, not an order of things in themselves.
30Further discussion of the issue can be found in [Strawson(1966), pp. 97-112].
31[Kant(1781), B 157], quotation owing to [Strawson(1966)].
32It could be argued that perhaps other people identify me with my body just by
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Strawson comes to the conclusion that Kant’s explanation of the possi-
bility of transcendental self-consciousness is based on the claim that we are
conscious of our synthesizing activity (whereby intuitions are brought under
concepts) or at least of our power to do so.33 “[O]ur consciousness of the
identity of ourselves is fundamentally nothing but our consciousness of this
power of synthesis, . . . , and of its exercise.”34 It will be argued in section
5 that “the consciousness of this power of synthesis” arises specifically upon
semantic considerations about judgements or claims that one is about to
endorse.
2.2.2 Empirical consciousness
The importance of the distinction between empirical and transcendental self-
consciousness lies in the fact that the latter is no object of experience: it is a
necessary feature of the phenomenon of consciousness, not some pure mind
of its own. Therefore, in trying to explain scientifically the mystery of con-
sciousness, we should not be led astray and look for an empirical account
of an entity called consciousness (the purely thinking “I”), because there is
no such entity. However, the features which Kant specifies under the term
‘transcendental’ may have natural foundation which we may be cognitively
open to.35 What I am suggesting is this: consciousness, as an explanandum
of natural sciences, is not an entity with powers too mysterious36 to be ac-
counted for by current scientific concepts; it is rather a feature distinctive
for human mind, thattself is best understood as a file of cognitive faculties
extrapolating the identification from their own case, i.e. that the identification with one’s
body is primary and identification of the others is only derived. I doubt it could be so. We
only need to realize that every communication is somehow embodied. If we were telepaths
with no need for overt communication, we would probably find it a mere stipulation that
selves should be identified with bodies.
33Kant’s version of the same claim can be found at B 133.
34[Strawson(1966), p. 94].
35Note the change in force of the intuition that drives McGinn to his conclusion about
cognitive closure: once the hard-to-explain matter is a feature (and not an entity), it
seems more likely to be accountable for by science, since the feature specifies a conceivable
function and we know that the same function may be realized by various means. That
is, once we concede that we need to know how the “I think” can potentially accompany
every mental state, we know at least what we are looking for and may even have a rough
idea how to get to it thanks to our knowledge of similarly structured problems (how can
“. . . is true” accompany any declarative sentence? - by stating that S and “S is true.” are
equivalent in meaning).
36The prime example of such power, that is regarded as beyond contemporary scientific
conceptual scheme, is intentionality. This stance together with the conviction that con-
sciousness is a natural phenomenon leads to attempts (for example, by John Searle) to
establish intentionality as a new non-analyzable physical concept beside force, charge etc.
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which we can recognize and which are exhibited by a perceivable being. And
unless we find reasons to think that the faculties may be exhibited by, for
example, organisms only, we should not restrict the domain of things eligible
for consciousness.
In my view then, consciousness is a term much more specific than mind:
it refers to our37 potentiality of elevating any mental state to a higher level
of attention by realizing that the mental state occurs to oneself. Thus I pro-
pose to interpret Kantian phrase about “I think” possibly accompanying all
my states as suggesting a higher-order theory of consciousness according to
which to be conscious of X is essentially to entertain a higher-order thought
that I think/perceive/believe X. Such an interpretation is at most a first ap-
proximation rather than a satisfying explanation, for many important issues
are left unresolved. Does a higher-order mental state need to actually occur
in order for us to be conscious of its lower-order content? In what medium
of representation is the higher-order thought about its content? In virtue of
what do we possess the capacity for higher-order thoughts? Or is it an un-
analyzable cognitive function? How is consciousness of mental states related
to transcendental consciousness? P. Carruthers puts forward a theory that
tries to answer some of these questions. For an outline of the theory and to
get a better idea of what higher-order theories of consciousness involve, see
appendix A.
A simpler but circular explanation would be that consciousness refers
to our potentiality to bring any mental state before the mind’s eye, to get
conscious of it. It is a peculiar feature of the concept of consciousness that any
attempt at its straightforward specification defies non-circular definition (or
definition in which the explanation is postponed to the definition of another
obscure term, like “attention”).
2.2.3 Natural foundation of transcendental features
It is necessary now to shed more light on the relation between the transcen-
dental character of the concept of consciousness as I intend it to employ it in
this work and its purported empirical foundation. To repeat: the transcen-
dental unity of apperception represents a necessary condition for there to be
a mind having experience as Kant understood it. In the minimal interpreta-
tion, the property that it must be possible for the “I think” to accompany
any mental state is a logical property of mind, rather than empirical. Thus
37While referring explicitly to human minds now, I do not preclude other beings’ minds
to happen to exhibit this potentiality as well. The specific reference is only to help the
reader understand the content of the term, for it is generally held to be a distinctive feature
of humans among various beings nowadays considered as having a kind of mind.
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it does not follow that consciousness of something is caused by occurence
of a mental state of the form “I think of x.” But if it is not an empirical
property, what sense does it have to look for its natural foundation?
Here we have to plunge deeper into Kant’s theory apperception. Accord-
ing to Kant, we are transcendetally conscious of ourselves by the very act
of representing, not by representing ourselves as an object of inner sense
(which gives rise to empirical self-consciousness). Again, the “I” in this self-
consciousness is only apperceived, and thus it is devoid of any properties
which are otherwise, i.e. in ordinary perception (both inner and outer),
means of identification. Meaning of the “I” of apperception is that it is the
logical subject in which all acts of synthesis are united, which is the con-
dition of possibility for unified experience. Kant stresses the merely logical
character of unity:
The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times
is . . . only a formal condition of my thought and their coher-
ence, and in no way proves the numerical identify of my subject.
[Kant(1781), A 363], cited by [Sellars(1974)]
As Sellars subsequently points out, this “suggests the possibility that suc-
cessive acts of thought might belong together, as acts of the same I, and
yet be successive states of different noumenal subjects.”38 For us, the im-
portant consequence is this: somehow the acts of synthesis are necessarily
united in the transcendental “I” by having the property (which is not stipu-
lated but transcendentally inferred) that one is conscious of them by doing
them. The (inter)dependence of the “I” and acts of synthesis is logical, not
causal. Finally, the answer to the question about natural foundation of tran-
scendental features is following: the acts of synthesis are open to empirical
scrutiny because judgements (the outcome of synthesis) can be expressed in
language. Therefore, it might be meaningful to investigate whether taking
acts of synthesis literally as utterances could in any way make the transcen-
dental relation of consciousness and synthesis clearer. Certainly, this holds
only if we accept that the conceptual is tightly linked to the linguistic.
2.3 The conceptual and the linguistic
Intuitions are brought under concepts in the act of synthesis. The stan-
dard account of Kant’s Copernican revolution is that things appear to us
as they do because our cognitive capacities inevitably impose certain coher-
ent conceptual framework on things in themselves. Some of the conceptual
38[Sellars(1974)].
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structuring is intrinsic to human mind, namely that which corresponds to
categories as arrived at by the Metaphysical deduction.39 The rest, it can
be said, is derived or acquired. Now, I am convinced that the sense of the
term “concepts” is best explicated as an abstraction of meanings of type-
identical linguistic expressions from their symbolic embodiment40 and the
circumstances in which they were used. By illustration, we often express
meaning of a linguistic expression by means of concepts: “The word ‘le chien’
means dog.” This is truly understood as an explanation, not just as a rule
of translation “le chien” → “the dog”. Thus I am commited to saying that
whoever has mastered language is also capable of conceptual structuring. Or
to state it as a logical relation: the linguistic is sufficient for the conceptual.
This may seem very bold initially, but it is rather a trivial statement under
the following intepretation. Mastering language requires that the speaker
recognizes rules that govern the use of linguistic expressions (which does
not imply that she always abides these rules). A law-like disposition of a
digital thermometer to produce certain strings of symbols, or conditioned
articulated sounds of a parrot, are not linguistic expressions proper. The
rules themselves are all that is needed to have a working concept. So the
linguistic is sufficient for the conceptual because in order to be a speaker of
language, one has to internalize rules of use - and these are constitutive of
concepts.
The reverse is true as well: the conceptual is sufficient for the linguistic.
If one is a being among other beings in the world, all it takes to have a
language is to assign each concept some unique symbolic representation such
that it can be easily recognized by one’s peers’ perceptual faculties. That is,
it only needs that vehicles be construed that would convey the concepts.
It follows from mutual sufficiency that the linguistic is necessary for the
conceptual and vice versa, and therefore they are (logically) equivalent. In
effect, the link is now as tight as it can be - perhaps so tight that one
doubts whether the distinction between the conceptual and the linguistic
is still worth preserving. I propose the reader accepts it now as a working
hypothesis with the prospect that it will be argued for in section 3.1, along
with its application to the explanation of the relation between language and
consciousness.
39Its intrinsic nature follows from the inherence of our cognitive capacities: “Kant’s
revolutionary move was to see the categories as concepts of functional roles in mental
activity. Categorial concepts are not, indeed, innate. They are formed by abstraction, not,
however, by reflecting on the self as object, but by reflecting on its conceptual activities.”
[Sellars(1974), p. 68].
40I thereby mean both sounds and spatially extended signs.
2.4 The Hard problem revisited 27
2.4 The Hard problem revisited
Let me return to our original point of departure, the Hard problem. I have ar-
gued that identifying qualia (or what-it-is-likeness) as the really hard part of
the mind-body problem is conceptually wrong because we do not even know
what exactly they are, not to mention what role they play in our minded-
ness; thus I rejected that the concept ‘quale’ could substantiate the second
premise of the explanatory argument. I have brought together some findings
on Kant’s concept of transcendental self-consciousness in an attempt to 1)
isolate the aspect of the mind which makes the mind-body problem hard and
confusing; and 2) make clearer what actually needs to be explained, what
the mystery of consciousness is about. Finally, in the previous section I in-
dicated that the process of synthesis could be studied at the explicit level
of linguistic judgements. So, recognizing transcendental self-consciousness as
the hard part that we should focus on leads us to study how concepts are em-
ployed; because, to repeat once again, the transcendental self-consciousness
is constituted by the very doing of synthesis. And we can study it through
studying language, under the simplifying but, as I hope, fruitful assumption
of the tight link between the linguistic and the conceptual.
The above outlined reformulation of the Hard problem is safe, I believe,
from Chalmers’ argument aimed against the theorists inclining to functional-
ism who allegedly tend to reduce the Hard problem to a set of easy problems
of how our cognitive abilities (functionally specified) are realized. While it is
true that Kantian transcendental self-consciousness is described in terms of
structure and function (which is a necessary consequence of transcendental
inference), explanation of its natural foundation seems to be no easier than
explaining the original what-it-is-likeness of experience – it is only more spe-
cific and therefore intelligible, which is surely a merit, not a drawback.
What makes the newly stated Hard problem really hard now is meaning.
It is generally acknowledged that human sapience consists in operation on
meanings, be they recognized in words or acts. Despite many efforts, we
still lack a satisfying account of meaning. We conceive of meaning as of that
which governs the use (and even misuse) of linguistic expressions in order
to convey a message. To the best of my knowledge, there is no theory that
would convincingly explain the constitution of meaning or its nature. On the
other hand, substantial facts about language and communication have been
revealed during the pursuit of meaning’s nature which can be found relevant
for consciousness. On the following pages, I will try to assemble the relevant
findings while keeping them nested in the theories they come from so that
the context, in which they were conceived, ensures that their relevance will
not be exaggerated.
28 3 CONCEPTS AND COMPOSITIONALITY
3 Concepts and compositionality
The conceptual exhibits (being tightly linked to the linguistic, as discussed
above) various features some of which may be highly relevant for transcen-
dental self-consciousness. There are two major issues in relation to which I
will discuss the features: compositionality and the nature of meaning. Be-
fore I tackle these issues, however, let me briefly specify some ontological
constraints of the conceptual as I understand it.
3.1 Some ontological remarks about the conceptual
Experience arises when intuitions are brought under concepts. Experience
is undoubtedly individual, and so are intuitions, being yielded by sensation.
What about concepts? Both options seem to be possible. Either we can say
that everybody employs her own concepts, applying, as it were, individual
conceptual framework on the undifferentiated matter of sensibility. Or we can
take conceptualization to be a relation of a subject to her individual intuitions
and universal concepts. Both options face their difficulties. If concepts are
taken to be individual (for example, as mental particulars), it is difficult to
account for intersubjective understanding: do we not mean the same thing
by saying/thinking that the cat is on the mat? There is no way to establish
whether someone’s judgement that the cat is on the mat is in fact someone
else’s judgement that the undetached cat-part is on the mat.41 For there
is no metalanguage (independent, universal) of thought into which different
conceptual frameworks could be reliably translated and thereby compared
with each other. On the other hand, if concepts are held to be universal,
such that individuals (precisely: their faculty of understanding) relate their
intuitions to them, it is difficult to account for the basis of disagreement.
If I claim “This shirt is blue.” while someone else claims “This shirt is
grey.”, is it because we differ in intuitions, or in concepts tokened by our
faculty of understanding, or in our word-concept associations? Any answer
to this question would be arbitrary. To prefer one choice over the others is to
prefer one locus of semantic relativity over others: the cause of disagreement
may be identified as a difference between men’s sensibility, understanding
or linguistic capacity. Surely, arguments can be presented in favour of any
locus, so that the choice does not appear arbitrary, but every argument, I
daresay, would be inference to the best explanation, where “the best” is again
41The allusion to the radical indeterminacy of translation actually does not show that
there is some inherent inconsistency in the conceptual thus conceived. It rather shows
that the conceptual is of no or little use in explaining meaning and mutual understanding,
for all that is comparable are linguistic expressions.
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to be judged according to one’s preference about what should be considered
constant among people.
If we take seriously the previous paragraph, together with the proposed
tight link between the conceptual and the linguistic, why do we not abandon
talking about concepts at all? What explanatory function does the con-
ceptual serve that we cannot dispose of it in favour of the linguistic only?
Intuition suggests that perhaps not all experience is articulated (mentally)
in words and yet it is logically structured in such a way that it can serve as
a premise in inference, or that it can eventually be articulated if the right
words are chosen. This suggestion reveals commitment to the conceptual
as the language of thought which is usually accompanied by the claim of
semantic primacy of the conceptual (at least in the order of explanation),
i.e. meaning is primarily property of thoughts and words acquire it only
derivatively by expressing them. However, the language of thought hypoth-
esis is an extraordinary semantic theory and concepts can be dissociated
from words and meanings even if we do not adopt it. In different perspec-
tive, concepts can be identified with meanings: concepts are abstract entities
with properties that determine the correct use of words that express them.
The conceptual so conceived is employed in purely semantic theories which
are not concerned with psychological aspect of language production; they ac-
count for the meaning of utterances, not for the process the outcome of which
is the utterance itself. In the Kantian paradigm adopted here, however, we
need to account for the individual act of synthesis. So even if we take the
second option, according to which concepts are universal, that is in accord
with the meaning-concept identification, there are still individual tokenings
of concepts that do not occur haphazardly but according to rules (embedded
in understanding). There is lot of empirical evidence in support of the fact
that people differ in those rules. It is most clear in cases of classification. I
can conceptualize a blindworm as snake while someone else as lizard; and
it does not necessarily follow we have different opinions on what should count
as a snake or a lizard - I can be eventually corrected that the blindworm is
actually a lizard if I conform to the same regulative force of the meaning of
“snake” as the other. Still, my idiosyncratic rules may classify the percept as
of a snake.42 Therefore concepts may represent universal meanings but there
42What if somebody argued that my conceptual classification as either a snake or a
lizard is indeterminate until I make the judgement, i.e. articulate it explicitly as “This is
a snake.” (be it overtly or in one’s mind)? For then I could either apply a word correctly
(i.e. in accord with its meaning) or incorrectly, because I do not know its meaning (and
thus I could not be persuaded logically that it is a lizard - only one’s authority could
make me concede it). But this would preclude the possibility of self-correction which
often happens. Also, the conceptual classification may clearly occur before anything that
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still have to be individual rules of concept application. The qualification
“individual” means that the rules must be realized in every individual, not
that they must differ. In the naturalist approach to the mind, this amounts
to saying that the rules, despite their functional generality, are implemented
by cognitive mechanisms specific to each individual. But even under the
functional specification the rules may differ, as the idiosyncratic aspect of
language use suggests. This is the reason to keep “the conceptual” in our
explanatory vocabulary, distinct from words and meanings which must be
thought of as universal (or common).
3.2 Compositionality, productivity, systematicity
The capacity to understand and produce sentences which have never been en-
countered before is a distinctive feature of human mind, usually referred to as
‘productivity’. Productivity represents a strong reason to accept that mean-
ing in natural languages obeys the principle of compositionality: the meaning
of a complex expression is determined by its structure and the meanings of
its constituents.43 Thus productivity is achieved even with finite sets of
semantically primitive expressions and grammatical (syntactical) rules. Fi-
nally, systematicity is a feature of language that also supports the principle
of compositionality: there are discernible patterns among sentences such that
apprehending a sentence under some such pattern is often sufficient for un-
derstanding a sentence of the same pattern with different constituents with
which the subject is familiar.44
3.2.1 Compositionality - a fact or a principle?
Neither productivity nor systematicity are conclusive for compositionality -
first, it is (only) inference to the best explanation that yields compositionality
out of either of the two, and second, there are notorious counterexamples from
we could call articulation: my sudden alertness is due to the belief that snakes can be
poisonous (while lizards are less likely to be) and the belief that what I have encountered
is snake.
43Definition taken from [Szabo´(2004)].
44Clearly, this holds only if the pattern of a sentence is recognized as well. We are not
concerned here with the process of language acquisition, at some stages of which it may
happen that a child understands, say, “The cat is on the mat.” and does not understand
“The dog is on the table.” even though it knows dogs and tables (now entertaining
‘understanding’ in a rather relaxed sense). Probably there must be first some conception
of the meaning of a sentence as a whole than the general pattern can be recognized through
acquaintance with other examples - especially if sentences are the basic units of semantic
evaluation.
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natural languages that seem to violate the principle. A brief discussion of
one type of counterexamples (which attracts perhaps the most of attention)
will show that the status of compositionality depends, unsurprisingly, on the
conception of meaning. Consider two sentences:
(a) Carla believes that eye doctors are rich.
(b) Carla believes that ophthalmologists are rich.45
While one sentence can be true, the other may be false, despite the fact
that the embedded clauses are semantically equivalent because ‘eye doctors’
and ‘ophthalmologists’ are synonyms. This example violates composition-
ality - but only in the framework of truth-conditional semantics, because
meanings of the complex sentences (their truth value) do not compose in the
same way even though meanings of their constituents are identical. Should
we conclude that compositionality does not hold or that truth-conditional se-
mantics is inadequate for natural languages? Or that special semantics has to
be designed for propositional attitudes whose context is referentially opaque?
The fact that semanticists will rather try to amend their theories than give
up on compositionality suggests that it is a feature worth preserving in any
theory of meaning.
But the issue may be taken even further: does compositionality follow
from the nature of meaning, or is it a regulative principle that determines
meanings? To appreciate the question, consider that compositionality as de-
fined above is compatible with an almost reverse claim, called Frege’s context
principle: the meaning of an expression is determined by the meanings of all
complex expressions in which it occurs as a constituent.46 Thus composition-
ality seems to fit both atomistic and holistic views on semantic primacy (i.e.
words or sentences); it is only if compositionality is interpreted as express-
ing the causal or explanatory order in the domain of meaning that semantic
atomism can be deduced from it.47 If meaning of an expression is a matter of
fact independent of the principle of compositionality (like in purely referen-
tial semantics) then compositionality may be demonstrated to be true. For it
may turn out that compositionality either holds or not. Clearly, any violation
of compositionality may be due to a wrong or incomplete model of meaning,
45Examples taken over from [Szabo´(2004)].
46Ibid.
47Szabo´ points out in his (2004) that ‘determination’ of meaning in the original defini-
tion (p. 30) is to be taken abstractly, disregarding its causal or explanatory connotations.
The definition then says no more than that there is a function from meanings of parts and
their structure to the meaning of the whole. A stronger, atomistic version of composition-
ality reads: complex expressions have their meanings in virtue of their structure and the
meanings of their constituents. This is a factual claim.
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but it should still follow, from the factualist stance to meaning, that compo-
sitionality is also a matter of fact. If, on the other hand, meaning is a matter
of convention then it is the very principle of compositionality which enables
us to abstract meaning of constituents of complex expressions by directing us
to look for identical semantical contribution of the constituents everywhere
they appear.48 This too rough a dichotomy suggests that while the former,
factualist consequence is congenial with semantic atomism, where emphasis
is put on representation, the latter is congenial with semantic pragmatism
and holism.
I owe the insight that compositionality might by understood as a regula-
tive principle to J. Peregrin, who argues in his (2005) that the principle of
compositionality is “(co-)constitutive of the concept of meaning, and thereby
of the concept of language.”49 He characterizes the issue about the factual
nature of compositionality as follows:
[E ]ither we can satisfactorily explicate the concept of meaning
without the help of [the principle of compositionality], and then
we are vindicated in taking the principle as an empirical thesis,
or we cannot do this, and then the compositionality of mean-
ing, and hence of language, is a con ceptual, ‘apriori’ matter.
[Peregrin(2005), section 1]
Exploring Frege’s work with its stress on semantic primacy of sentences
over words and the central role of truth in semantic considerations leads to
the suggestion that compositionality, in cooperation with other principles,
constrains what meanings of subsentential components could be, i.e. what is
their semantic contribution to the basic semantic value - truth of a sentence.
The important outcome is that while we can stipulate what meaning is in
whatever way we want (and then see whether compositionality obtains or
48The relation between conventionality and the regulative status of compositionality
deserves perhaps a further explanation. If meaning is conventional then so is the relation
of synonymy. If there are, as a matter of fact, no synonyms (which seems to follow from the
conventionality of meaning, as Quine’s discussion of the two dogmas of empiricism shows)
and if every word-type can be assigned different meanings anytime it compositionally
misbehaves, arguing that it is a case of homonymy, then compositionality is vacuously
true according to the factualist reading (for every word-token can be assigned a unique
meaning, and so it would be trivial to construct a function satisfying the compositionality
constraint). So it would not make sense to understand compositionality as a fact that
depends on some primary facts about meaning. The situation is reversed: meaning of an
expression is established so that it conforms to the principle of compositionality.
49[Peregrin(2005), section 1].
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not), if we heed to the sense of “meaning”50 then compositionality is already
entailed.
3.2.2 Locus of compositionality
A question may be asked to what extent is compositionality confined to the
linguistic only. Cannot we, after all, regard compositionality as a principle
of organization intrinsic to the faculty of understanding? Could we not hold
that part of our linguistic capacity, embedded in our cognition, is the ability
to derive semantic contributions of subsentential expressions so that we can,
in turn, employ them productively in forming new sentences? Let me spare
few arguments in favour of a positive answer to these questions.
The whole matter (and so the very soundness of the question) rests heav-
ily on the way we conceive of the relation between the linguistic and the
conceptual. Since the principle of compositionality speaks explicitly about
meanings of linguistic expressions, the principle can apply to (or hold in)
something non-linguistic only in a metaphorical sense. To say, for example,
that compositionality applies to the conceptual as well would be misleading,
for concepts are the very range of semantic evaluation function.51 We can
hardly speak about meaning of a concept if concepts are to be, besides the
individual aspect I exposed in 3.1, pure meanings. To be clear, it does not
follow that all concepts have to be simple. The belief in the distinction be-
tween simple and complex concepts does not commit us to the belief that
simple concepts compose into complex ones. Note that the stronger version
of the compositionality principle states that meaning of the complex expres-
sion is a function of meaning of its constituents and their structure – but
where is the structure of the conceptual to be observed? Perhaps all we
can say about a complex concept, say present-king-of-france, is that
it consists of concepts like present, king and of-france. The structure
remains unknown, unless we stipulate that the structure copies that of the
original linguistic expression.52 But to suppose that would be to treat the
50Which definitely is not the range of an abstract semantic mapping function that can
in principle contain any kind of objects.
51To my surprise, talking about compositionality of concepts is not rare. Fodor in his
(2008) seems to take compositionality as originally applying to concepts, which are types
of tokens in LOT. Even his critics (in [Prinz and Clark(2004)]) take on compositionality of
concepts. If the only way to find out how thoughts are conceptually structured is to express
them in a sentence, I don’t see how compositionality of concepts could be non-derivative
from that of words. Clearly, I am missing something.
52The problem does not disappear, however. It is only postponed to the discussion
about criteria of primitive concepts. Is bachelor a simple or complex concept? If it
is simple, what is the meaning of “A bachelor is an unmarried man.” (how could the
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conceptual as the language of thought. Indeed, then it could make sense that
concepts compose, although it would still be a vacuous claim, for the lan-
guage of thought must be compositional in order to account for productivity.
To sum up, I think compositionality cannot be transferred from its natural
habitat (the linguistic) without adaptation.
The adaptation which I propose consists in conceiving the principle of
compositionality as a description of a necessary feature of our cognition. In
the non-factualist reading, compositionality can be seen as a regulative prin-
ciple according to which users of language abstract meaning of semantically
incomplete expressions.53 The regulative principle has to be hardwired in our
cognition, for it must guide us in the process of language acquisition. One
cannot be told that language is compositional before one masters it. And
one could hardly realize it just by studying patterns of sounds or symbols
unless one already had a propensity to conceive of meaning as compositional.
Such propensity, together with the capacity to actually recognize semantic
contributions of parts to the whole, would then be one of the prerequisites
for language acquisition that Chomsky held to be innate.
3.2.3 Compositionality and reflexion
Finally, what is the purpose of adaptation of compositionality to the level
of understanding? I suggested to take quite literally Kant’s claim that it
must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations.
Specifically, the capacity to prefix any representation with the “I think” is
constitutive of consciousness. The actual operation of adding the “I think” is
usually called ‘reflexion’, and it is a philosophical standard to claim that we
can, in principle, reflect on any mental state, even on a reflective act itself.54
It seems to me that philosophical tradition has often treated reflexion as so
a fundamental capacity of human mind that it could hardly be explained in
terms of something else.
Now, there is a feature of reflexion which invites an explanation based on
linguistic considerations: every reflective act is unique, because the objects of
reflexion are unique, and yet we claim they are yielded by a single capacity.55
definiens of a simple concept be complex?). If it is complex, can the conceptual structure
be independent of the linguistic definition?
53I.e. expressions that by themselves cannot be assigned primitive meaning, e.g. sub-
sentential expressions according to semantic holism.
54I do not thereby wish to commit myself to any particular ontology of the mind. You
can read ‘mental state’ as anything you think that one may be conscious of - thoughts,
representations, proposition, feelings etc.
55Compare with the capacity of driving: we tend to say that acts of driving cars and
bicycles are exercises of different capacities.
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This suggests that reflexion is a formal operation – its sense is independent
of the meaning of the ‘mental content’ it is applied to. In terms of a higher-
order theory of consciousness, this means that the ‘semantic’ contribution
of reflexion56 to the resulting higher-order thought is always the same, no
matter what the object of reflexion is. The semantic contribution consists
basically in attributing a thought to oneself. To put it another way, consider
a reflexion-expressing sentence “I think that S.” In the sense of reflexion, it is
a de dicto statement: I attribute to myself an object, the thought the content
of which is expressed by S. If the semantic contribution of the “I think” is to
be identical for all acts of reflexion, it suggests that compositionality applies
also to the level of representation of thoughts.57
At last, let me bring all the threads together. If we hold that compo-
sitionality is a principle that applies not only to linguistic expressions but
may, mutatis mutandis, apply also to the level of representation of thoughts
(the conceptual, as described in 3.1), then we can account for productivity
of thinking that is not articulated in any specific language. For otherwise
we would either have to claim that all thinking and reasoning (unconscious
notwithstanding) is essentially linguistic,58 or we would have to admit that
complex thinking just happens. Assuming the higher-order theory of con-
sciousness, we can thus allow for the intuition that I can be conscious of
something without being conscious of its articulation in any language I know.
The intuition may be wrong, as I am sometimes inclined to think, but peo-
ple would still like to claim that they, by introspection, know that some of
56Obviously, the contribution may be called ‘semantic’ only in the derivative sense of se-
mantic contribution of the subsentential part expressing reflexion (“I think”) to the mean-
ing of a sentence expressing the higher-order thought itself (“I think S.”). Admittedly,
such a clarification betrays a question-begging commitment to the claim that reflexion is
ultimately a linguistic operation, for it is yet to be demonstrated that language enables
reflexion. However, this step could be vindicated if 1) its purpose is taken to be only fa-
cilitation of the intuition of what the formality of reflexion means; and 2) if the functional
contribution of reflexion to our cognition is the same as the linguistic operation of adding
the “I think” clause. I believe the latter is true, but it would be lengthy diggression to
argue for it here.
57I don’t think that speaking of a level of representation of thoughts commits us to
anything like mentalese. I think, however, that one has to conceive of thoughts at such a
level of description where thoughts represent. That is, while we may have good reasons to
believe that thoughts are actually realized by parallel distributed processes in brain, where
it is hard, if not impossible, to imagine what an analogue of compositionality would be,
we will still identify thoughts by what they are about. Thus at that level of description,
we are entitled to treat thoughts as representations.
58This is not to suggest that this option is in any way deficient. It may eventually appear
to be right, though I reckon that would be for reasons unrelated to compositionality. For
the time being, I only want to keep the options open.
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their thoughts are explicitly articulated (like inner exclamation “What the
hell does that mean?”) and others are not.59 Furthermore, the recursive
character of reflexion60 invites the idea that it obeys the principle of com-
positionality. While it may be difficult to make sense of compositionality
as working for anything else than linguistic expressions, we have to posit
it for the conceptual, I think, if we take the argument from productivity
and systematicity of thinking seriously. I am convinced that the alternative
of conflating the conceptual with the linguistic leads to even less desirable
difficulties.
4 Meaning and Intentionality
4.1 From consciousness to meaning. . .
I have argued that the best explanation of the iterative and formal character
of reflexion is that it is governed by the same principles as forming sentences
of the pattern “I think that S.” Sometimes the mystery of consciousness
is phrased, in order to make it clearer and tangible, as the problem how
one becomes conscious of yet unconscious content. For example, how could
computer become conscious (say, of its own states)? Such phrasing may be,
however, tendentious, since its presuppositions are by no means uncontro-
versial. First, is consciousness necessarily a relation of a self to some content
– like special index that the content acquires when some internal process is
performed? Second, is content conceivable without its apprehension, or in
other words, is it meaningful to speak of unconscious content? The phrasing
with its presuppositions invites specific theory of mind and meaning, namely
representational theory of mind (RTM) coupled with language of thought hy-
pothesis (LOT), the main champion of which is Jerry Fodor. Assuming RTM
with LOT, consciousness could be understood as follows (submitted to the
constraints of consciousness that I have sketched so far): a creature is con-
scious of content C, expressible by sentence S, if the creature has currently a
token in LOT the content of which is expressed by the sentence “I think that
59Whether to reject this intuition, or save it and explicate its sense, depends on what
we intend to mean by ‘articulation’, which again depends on our conception of the link
between the linguistic and the conceptual. If articulation is a process in our language-
production module, i.e. the process psycholinguistics is interested with, then the intuition
should be saved. If, on the other hand, articulation means just conceptualization then
the intuition should be rejected. A way to distinguish between these two senses could be
auxiliary judgement whether articulation is held to be language-specific, i.e. whether it is
identifiable in what language the content is articulated.
60For clarification, see appendix A, p. 67.
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S.”61 That is, however, more likely an account of the empirical consciousness,
which is to be distinguished from the transcendental consciousness pursued
here.
The preceding example of an account of consciousness, by means of illus-
trative RTM that has had a long tradition in the philosophy of mind, was to
point at mutual dependence between theory of meaning and theory of mind
(and consequently of consciousness). Semantics constrains theory of mind,
and vice versa. That is no coincidence, since consciousness is intuitively an
effect of conceptualization: whatever we are conscious of, it must be concep-
tually structured. As for the other direction, any account of meaning more
or less directly implies what kind of things the things that understand or act
upon meanings (i.e. minds) must be.
Usually, one does not consider her semantics and theory of mind simulta-
neously, but selects the starting point at one and then see the consequences
to the other. The preference of choice may be based on conviction about
the relative conspicousness of what the mind/meaning is, or about primacy
in the explanatory or causal order etc. The concept of transcendental self-
consciousness is particularly non-commital about theory of meaning, espe-
cially if interpreted along the original, highly abstract and formal, Kantian
lines. What seems to be clear, however, is that Kant’s explication of the tran-
scendental self-consciousness, as the “I think” that must possibly accompany
any representation, is not an allusion to the possibility of merely syntactic or
formal extension. Taking the explication quite literally as I have suggested
drives us to the conclusion that consciousness has perhaps “something to
do” with the meaning of the “I think”. Perhaps, by exploring what meaning
might be, we could get better grip on what transcendental self-consciousness
amounts to.
4.2 . . . via intentionality. . .
For most purposes of this work it is not necessary to delve into specifically
semantic technicalities; so for convenience and clarity I will make do with
discussing options about what is “to have (semantic) content”62 which is
61More elaborate version could also deal with contents that may be expressible by sub-
sentential expressions, such as noun phrases (and these are, allegedly, expressing content,
since the semantics of LOT is representational and atomistic), if forms of consciousness
other than “I think that S” are allowed - e.g. “I see [NP].” Similarly, propositional atti-
tudes other than thinking may be stipulated to be sufficient for consciousness (“I wish that
S.”). However, this can be achieved on pain of consciousness coming in different flavours
the common denominator of which remains unexplained.
62[Haugeland(1990), p. 384].
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reasonably close to having intentionality – according to J. Haugeland, whose
article offers a useful overview and classification presented below. As far as
I understand it, the concept of ‘semantic content’, that Haugeland uses to
express what intentionality amounts to, can be identified with meaning. So
we will eventually come to know what it is for something to have meaning –
and that will be just enough for further discussions of consciousness; precise
models explaining why something means A rather than B are beyond our
needs as long as we have a general idea how the issue can be resolved.
4.2.1 Some general remarks on intentionality
i. Some things can be said to have meaning only derivatively (for instance,
thoughts confer meaning to sentences that express them, thus sentences
have derivative intentionality and thoughts original one), which presup-
poses there be something exhibiting original intentionality, which is the
actual matter of discussion.
(ii.) Intentionality as a relation between the content bearer (e.g. a thought)
and what it is about (e.g. a state of affairs) is peculiar in that the
latter may not exist/occur. Yet intentionality also ought to have causal
powers in order to make sense of our folk-psychological explanations
that we did this for that reason.
iii. All three accounts of intentionality to be presented are designed to be
compatible with materialism, which specifically precludes resorting to
stipulation of intentionality as an intrinsic property (of things consid-
ered contentful).
(iv.) Consequently, since content (meaning) of something cannot be deter-
mined only by its own properties, it must be determined by its relation
to other things, by “some larger pattern into which it fits.”63
Points (ii.) and (iv.) are put in brackets because the sense Haugeland
attaches to them seems to be biased in favour of his own, pragmatic account
of intentionality. The non-existence of the second relatum mentioned in (ii.)
is interpreted as necessarily a normative feature of intentionality (e.g. a belief
can be right or wrong). The dependence on some larger pattern in (iv.) is
intepreted as holism. I don’t think Fodor, for example, would concede to
these interpretations, but since these are important points that would come
into consideration anyway, I keep them in the list.
63[Haugeland(1990), p. 386].
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4.2.2 Fodor and neo-cartesianism
Neo-cartesianism is a label for the doctrine that only mental states are in the
proper sense intentional. Mental states are some cognitive system’s internal
tokens that can be specified both intentionally (as symbols) and formally (as,
for example, physical configurations). Thus some clearly delineated physical
thing works as a symbol with equally determinate meaning (so-called token-
token identity theory). Meaning of a symbol depends entirely on its formal
properties, or as Haugeland puts it more precisely: “the semantics of the
symbols is a systematic function of their formal character as tokens.”64
In line with the general point (iv.) from the previous paragraph, Hauge-
land interprets neo-cartesianism as endorsing that “separate mental states
have their contents in virtue of their systematic relations to one another.”65
Though it is certainly a reasonable position, Fodor does not seem to take it.
In his recent monography on language of thought, he puts forward purely ref-
erential, atomistic semantics that can supposedly do justice to intentionality.
Specifically, one of the tenets of his theory reads:
The metaphysics of concept possession is atomistic. In prin-
ciple, one might have any one concept without having any of the
others (except that having a complex concept requires having its
constituent concepts).66
This can be so because Fodor builds up his theory of mind as represen-
tational and semantics as referential. Neither reference nor representation is
a normative relation; for a symbol to refer to something is to be locked to it:
“If M is a mental representation locked to property P, then ‘tokens of P cause
tokens of M’ is counterfactual supporting.”67 So stated, reference/locking is
a nomological relation between a symbol and a property, but its naturaliza-
tion is straightforward: just find the actual causal mechanism that reliably
correlates internal states with properties.
Fodor tries to evade the charge of the necessarily normative character
of meaning/intentionality. He seems to concede that symbols can be used
correctly or incorrectly in speech acts (so he accepts the normative charac-
ter of symbols-in-use) and also that this normativity cannot be reduced to
causation (which is, however, sufficient for an account of reference), but he
replies:
64[Haugeland(1990), p. 389].
65[Haugeland(1990), p. 388].
66[Fodor(2008), p. 141].
67Ibid.
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[W]e’re committed to LOT; and LOT, though it is a system of
representations, isn’t a system of representation that anybody
uses, correctly or otherwise. One doesn’t use thoughts, one just
has them.68 [Fodor(2008), p. 203]
Coming back to Haugeland, he insists that “specifying [tokens’] symbolic
contents can be regarded as interpreting them.”69 The interpretation in neo-
cartesianism is then constrained by the demand for ‘truth’ (correspondence
of the pattern of tokens to some state of affairs) and ‘intrasystematic ratio-
nality’. But even if interpretation of symbols has to take into account the
holistic pattern of tokens and corresponding referents in order for the con-
tents to be both systematic and sensible,70 it does not provide the criteria
for distinguishing original and derivative intentionality. A piece of text may
exhibit the same interpretation-relevant pattern as a set of mental states of a
thinking thing. Thus what makes the latter the domain of original intention-
ality are causal relations between mental states qua inner symbols. Thanks
to the token-token identity, the very same thing that is the basic unit of
semantic evaluation (that means: is a content bearer) has causal powers due
to its physical properties. It is because the appropriate tokens (e.g. such
that their contents are A and A → B) actually jointly cause tokening of
the right symbol (B) that the system of so related tokens exhibits original
intentionality. This is an expression of computational theory of mind (CTM)
which is so intimately related to LOT that either can be regarded as the
motivation for the other. Fodor, at least, builds his LOT semantics with the
goal of getting CTM work.
Ultimately, symbol’s content is determined by its formal (syntactical, to
be more specific) properties because these alone determine its causal powers;
and the content of a symbol depends entirely on causal relation to the world
and/or other symbols.71 Fodor realizes that his emphasis on reference as
the sole and basic semantic relation leads to difficulties in accounting for
many of the subtle differences in meaning which we recognize in extensionally
68The commitment to LOT stems from the indispensibility of folk-psychology in our
everyday life. Fodor holds that the ontological commitment of belief or thought ascriptions
had better be taken seriously; not as mere fac¸ons de parler.
69[Haugeland(1990), p. 389].
70Systematicity implies that any type of formal tokens corresponds to a type of content,
e.g. that any token of the string-type “c-a-t” has token of cat as its content. That
the interpretation be sensible means that the to-be-interpreted pattern of tokens should
correspond to the pattern of things the tokens are about, e.g. refer to. The details are at
[Haugeland(1990), p. 391].
71“You connect the causal properties of a symbol with its semantic properties via its syn-
tax. The syntax of a symbol is one of its higher-order physical properties.” [Fodor(1987),
p. 18].
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equivalent expressions. Unsurprisingly then, large part of his LOT 2 book
is devoted to the attempt to deal with Frege’s problem that gave rise to the
familiar distinction between sense and reference. It is enough to say that
LOT purportedly meets Frege’s problem by an appeal to CTM from which
it follows that there could be more types of representations for the same
referent.72 The direction of looking at meaning Fodor maintains is more
important: see how mental particulars bear content and how thinking can
be a causal process; the rest should follow.
Why does Fodor try so stubbornly to avoid semantic holism and sticks
to atomism? Because he is convinced that “compositionality is at the heart
of the productivity and systematicity of thoughts.”73 Most of the semantic
theories discussed in his LOT 2 are criticised on compositionality’s behalf.
Any semantics that fails to be compositional should be rejected outright.
The architecture of his theory of meaning follows from the demand for com-
positionality:
Referentialism must be right about the content of intentional
states because compositionality demands it; atomism must be
right about the individuation of concepts because composition-
ality demands it; and thought must have constituent structures
because compositionality demands that too. . . . Most of what
we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of
thoughts.74
Apparently, compositionality according to Fodor is a fact, to refer to the
distinction made in 3.2.1.
4.2.3 Dennett and neo-behaviourism
As the reference to behaviourism suggests, the major point of divide from
neo-cartesianism is that beliefs, thoughts, reasons and other intentional enti-
ties are not held to be mental particulars. The ‘neo-’ distinction is allegedly
earned by somewhat more realistic attitude to the intentional ascription com-
pared to the old-style behaviourism. The pattern relevant for content de-
72It means, roughly, that mental state types that both refer to Cicero may have different
physical properties so that one can be interpreted as the concept Cicero while the other
as Tully. As Fodor summarizes, “From CTM’s perspective, the existence of Frege’s
problems shows at most that reference isn’t sufficient for the individuation of concepts;
something further is required. But Frege’s problem doesn’t show that the ‘something’ else
is a parameter of content; for example, that it is something like a sense.” [Fodor(2008), p.
70].
73[Fodor(2008), p. 20].
74Ibid.
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termination is the pattern “in the interactions between the system and its
environment.”75 An interaction is necessarily described in intentional terms
as a pair of perception and action.76
How do mental (or preferably ‘inner’, or ‘cognitive’) states come into
scene? By the need to ascribe some intermediary states to the system in or-
der to explain the system’s behaviour. Thus, a chess machine can be ascribed
states of knowing the chess rules and current board configuration, aiming to
win, strategy to control the centre ceteris paribus etc. Most importantly,
however, a particular state may have no other determination than inten-
tional,77 and its ascription “depends exclusively on the pattern exhibited in
perceptions and action.”78
Intentional ascription is guided by the aim to “maximize a system’s over-
all competence.”79 In other words, the ascription should be such that the
manifest behaviour is rational with regard to them, and successful in normal
circumstances.80 The trouble is that in maximizing a system’s competence
we may ascribe too much of intentionality.81 Somewhat obscure way out is
proposed, namely that one ought to rationalize only the manifest behaviour,
but the problem remains, I think, if only because what behaviour is mani-
fest is again observer-relative, and thus it seems to come down to a version
of Occam’s razor for intentional ascription: “Do not multiply intervenient
cognitive states beyond necessity.”
In an attempt to naturalize the intention-ascription process, Dennett ex-
75[Haugeland(1990), p. 395].
76The modal qualification is appropriate because to get started with some such pattern
at all we need to have pairs like [‘sees a lion’;‘runs away’] rather than [‘part of retinal
image is caused by a lion positioned north-east’;‘runs south-west’]. Without interpreting
the behaviour of a system at this basic level as actions (not events), we could not say
whether the interaction pair to be included in the relevant pattern is not, by chance,
[‘patch of blue sky is represented in the retinal image’;‘runs south-west’]. In consequence,
the relevant pattern is observer-relative, though constrained by the demand for consistency
and predictive success. That is, after all, what Dennett’s intentional stance implies.
77That is to say that such cognitive states may not be so clearly delineated at the level of
their physical realization. For this reason, Haugeland remarks, neo-behaviourism naturally
leans to the connectionist branch of cognitive science, while neo-cartesianism is in accord
with the classical AI.
78[Haugeland(1990), p. 396].
79[Haugeland(1990), p. 398].
80Unfortunately, specifying what counts as normal circumstances of an action already
presupposes knowledge of what the action should achieve, which is part of what is to be
ascribed. Perhaps we can replace it vaguely with ‘most of the time’. The idea is quite
simple in the end: don’t say cats want to make ratcatchers lose their job by catching mice;
that would render them stupid – because hopelessly unsuccessful.
81Haugeland uses an illustrative example of a mousetrap that wants to kill mice, believes
it can do so when they touch the bait, decides to snap etc.
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plains it as a capacity which evolved under the pressure of the need to predict
ever more complex behaviour of co-evolving organisms, including ourselves
(that prediction is a favourable skill itself depends on other ecological facts,
such that any organism is either a prey or a hunter of some other). There-
fore, in Dennett’s view, “[t]he only ‘original’ intentionality anywhere is the
mere as-if intentionality of the process of natural selection viewed from the
intentional stance.”82
Predictive success is then a normative measure of correctness of inten-
tional ascription. That it is not the only criterion of correctness seems to
follow from the possibility of many predictively equal interpretations some
of which would be rejected by common sense (see Haugeland’s mousetrap
example). Dennett addresses this issue when he notes that in interpreting
a behaviourally simpler system than us (which is most of the time) our lan-
guage cuts too fine. When we conceptualize the intentions to be ascribed,
we tend to express them in propositions that imply too fine a distinction in
the system’s cognition.
For instance, when a frog’s tongue darts out and catches whatever
is flying by, the frog may make a mistake - it may ingest a ball
bearing thrown by a mischievous child, or a fisherman’s lure on a
monofilament thread, or some other inedible anomaly. The frog
has made a mistake, but exactly which mistake(s) has it made?
What did the frog “think” it was grabbing? A fly? Airborne
food? A moving dark convexity? [Dennett(1996), pp. 50-51]
The tendency to specify the intension83 of a system’s intention can be
misleading. “The misguided goal propositional precision”, as Dennett calls
it, is the greatest danger of the intentional stance. If we are to avoid it, we
need to realize the following:
If the agent under examination doesn’t conceive of its circum-
stances with the aid of a language capable of making certain dis-
tinctions, the superb resolving power of our language can’t be har-
nessed directly to the task of expressing the particular thoughts,
or ways of thinking, or variaties of sensitivity, of that agent. (In-
directly, however, language can be used to describe those par-
ticularities in whatever detail the theoretical context demands.)
[Dennett(1996), p. 55]
82[Dennett(2006)]
83As Dennett notes, the intentional stance is referentially opaque, i.e. the plausibility
of intentional ascription depends on how the extension of an intention is picked up.
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It is the difference between expression and description which makes Den-
nett’s approach viable and theoretically profound, at least from the perspec-
tive of cognitive science.
Finally, meaning explicitly comes on stage when lingustic interactions can
be discerned among others. And they can by virtue of relative idenpendence
of other subject-environment interactions.
There could, for instance, be cognitive states of a distinctive sort
that are already formulated verbally within the linguistic faculty
- verbal cognitions, we might call them. And dispositions specific
to these states might interact among themselves in a way that is
relatively divorced from the agent’s other dispositions, and more
narrowly “logical.” [Haugeland(1990), p. 402]
Linguistic competence is still one of many competences a system might
exhibit and so meaning of a speech act is determined by the same principle
of ascription whose main criterion is success. Thus meaning of an utter-
ance comes from speaker’s intention - the change in environment she wants
to achieve by this action. Gricean conversational implicatures, for example,
exploit this point explicitly. Still, what remains to be seen, from the seman-
tic point of view, is what determines meaning of words and sentences (i.e.
linguistic types, not tokens in context as utterances and speech acts).
4.2.4 Brandom and neo-pragmatism
Neo-pragmatism thinks of anything contentful essentially in terms of social
practices. Unlike in neo-behaviourism, the pattern relevant for content de-
termination cannot be formed by any interaction between a subject and its
environment but mainly (or perhaps only) by interaction that can be shaped
by, and subjected to, ‘censouriousness’. Censorious behaviour is essentially
that which promotes conformism - the general tendency to act in accord
with already established norms. Thus punishing deviations from norms and
rewarding their abidance is censorious in that it reinforces the behavioural
pattern which fits in the present normative structure, way of life, or culture,
if you will.
Haugeland, who himself sides with neo-pragmatism, tries to delineate
conformism so that it is a behavioural trait which only acting creatures can
exhibit.84 Note, however, that subject’s environment is in a sense censorious
as well, namely in the sense of success evoked in neo-behaviourism. Sickness
84“Conformism here means not just imitativeness (monkey see, monkey do), but also
censoriousness - that is, a positive tendency to see that one’s neighbors do likewise, and
to suppress variation.” [Haugeland(1990), p. 404].
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caused by eating wildly coloured mushrooms is a punishment that can be said
to be promoting conformism to the norm “Don’t eat wildly coloured mush-
rooms.”85 It does not help appealing to the intuition that censoriousness
is surely to be understood as intentional (and the Nature does not clearly
harbour any such explicit intentions). For it not only begs the question of
what constitutes intentionality, but it also contradicts some obvious cases of
censorious behaviour that is not manifestly intentional. For example, our
unconsciously reserved behaviour towards frowning people (and warm one
towards smiling people) is perhaps a great enough punishment (reward) to
promote the social norm of smiling ceteris paribus.86 Thus the crucial prag-
matist restriction that the normative can only emerge from social behaviour
presupposes a theory of action such that 1) acts towards others may be per-
formed on the basis of only implicitly ‘recognized’ means and ends; and 2)
acts towards others ought to be distinguished from actions aimed to bring
about a change in environment.
At the bottom level, conformism can be a hard-wired trait of some organ-
isms (or systems generally) - such that the species is in effect called social.
A closer look at normativity of linguistic practices may reveal a feature both
distinguishing neo-pragmatism from neo-behaviourism and vindicating the
emphasis on social interaction. As R. Millikan observes, linguistic conven-
tions sustain because conforming to them helps to solve a coordination prob-
lem.87 Thus far it is just a variation on the neo-behavourist success story.
However, linguistic convention, unlike practical conventions like eating with
knife and fork or chopsticks, are established by there occuring a precedens
which is at that time contingent in respect to the function it serves and
which is followed from then on thanks to conformism. To illustrate, at the
time somebody first called a dog “chien” (and in such circumstances that
others’ conformist nature made them follow) there was nothing constraining
that first call to be “chien” rather than “pes” or “london” (unless these were
85A similar point is made by Dennett in his reaction to Brandom’s Making it Explicit.
Dennett disagrees with Brandom on the matter whether norms pertain essentially to com-
munities only. See [Dennett(2006)].
86Or is that a norm only in a metaphorical sense, not the norm proper? Taking such
a stance would, from the pragmatist point of view, betray unwarranted bias to some pre-
requisite of norm-institution (e.g. language or consciousness). If I understand it correctly,
pragmatism hopes to explain how any such putative prerequisite could arise as a cultural
phenomenon by virtue of norms, the presence of which does not necessarily depend on the
phenomenon itself.
87“A coordination problem arises when people have a purpose in common which must be
achieved by joint action, where the contribution that each must make will vary depending
on what each of the others contributes, and where there is more than one acceptable way
of combining contributions to produce a successful outcome.” [Millikan(2005), p. 55].
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already in use, of course). Importantly, others will comply with the prece-
dent use only if it is also advantageous to them as hearers. If “chien” were
being used inconsistently in presence of dogs, cats, birds etc., it would not
be taken upon (unless one could distinguish a different consistent usage in
it, e.g. that of “vertebrae”). Similarly, if promises were broken more often
than not and with no appropriate sanction, the institution of promise would
lose its binding force and therefore cease to exist.
A corollary is that the functions of public-language forms are
not on the same level as either speaker purposes or hearer pur-
poses taken alone. The conventional functions of language forms
are not, for example, merely standard speaker purposes. Conven-
tional language forms are selected for performing services satisfac-
tory at once to both partners in communication. Their functions
must balance speaker with hearer interests. Because the conven-
tional function of a linguistc form will remain stable only if it
continues to serve the interest of both speakers and hearers often
enough, I call it a ‘stabilizing function’. Linguistic ‘meaning’ in
the sense of stabilizing function is on an entirely different level
from, for example, average speaker meaning. [Millikan(2005), p.
58]
The last quoted sentence provides us with means for distinguishing be-
tween the general, public meaning of a linguistic form and meaning in the
sense of speaker’s intention; a distinction that is presumably difficult to artic-
ulate in neo-behaviourism, for there the latter is the sole sense of ‘meaning’.
The concept of norm is obviously central to pragmatism. What exactly
are they then?
When behavioral dispositions aggregate under the force of
conformism, it isn’t herds that coalesce, but norms. . . . Like
herds, norms are a kind of “emergent” entity, with an identity
and life of their own, over and above that of their constituents.
[Haugeland(1990), p. 405]
For an outsider, such a claim may seem to be a great ontological commitment;
for pragmatists, however, an inevitable one.
As I have already hinted above, if neo-pragmatism is to provide a causal
story of the origin of intentionality, norm-abiding must not require explicit
rule-following. This point should be granted unproblematically if the bio-
logical or evolutionary account of conformism, outlined above, is accepted.
In an important footnote, Haugeland clarifies the ontological commitment of
neo-pragmatism:
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There is a natural extension of the notion of following an ex-
plicit rule to that of a computer following an explicit program;
and it might be held that no material system could in fact ex-
hibit the required behavioral complexity and versatility unless it
explicitly followed a complex rule (program) “internally.” But
this is a strong and separate claim that calls for an independent
argument. The question is presumably in some sense empiri-
cal. [Neo-pragmatism], like [neo-behaviourism], need not be con-
cerned with how the dispositions are “implemented”; hence, it is
also entirely compatible with “distributed representation” models
of how it all works. [Haugeland(1990), footnote 24, p. 422]
Intrinsic to norm-abiding is the right recognition of circumstances in
which the norm applies. I may know that the younger should be, ceteris
paribus, introduced to the older first and may wish to comply, but I still may
violate the norm by failing to recognize who is younger. Loosely speaking,
part of the content of a norm are circumstances of appropriate application,
which is just to say that “norms have a kind of ‘if-then’ character, connect-
ing sorts of circumstance to sorts of behavior.”88 Consequently, norms are
interrelated by their conditions of right application.
Finally, what is the neo-pragmatist account of language? Unsurprisingly,
pragmatism advises to consider linguistic forms as tools. As hammers can
be used in a wrong way (holding it upside-down) or for wrong purposes
(killing), so similarly words or sentences may be used incorrectly or abused
(for lying, for instance). The reason why linguistic expressions are specific
tools among others is that their primary purpose is “to affect the current
normative circumstance, including the status of both utterer and audience.”89
For example, making a move in chess affects the normative circumstance in
the sense that now it is the other player’s turn, configuration of the board is
different etc. Similarly, asking someone a favour passes the initiative to the
trustee and binds her to either comply and earn one’s gratitude or reject on
pain of severing the personal relation.90 Original intentionality then belongs
to linguistic forms as conceived in their public, norm-constituting use.
R. Brandom, the apostle of inferentialism, puts forward a more compli-
cated view of the linguistic intentionality. He points out that where carte-
88[Haugeland(1990), p. 408].
89Ibid., p. 411.
90As the example shows, some moves in language games affect or depend on extralinguis-
tic circumstances; unlike in case of chess that is in this sense self-contained. As M. Lance
likes to put it: language is more like baseball than chess in that it requires a pitch, a base-
ball, etc. (not to mention obtaining physical laws). For more detail see [Haugeland(1990),
p. 412].
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sianism and traditional semantics relegate explanations on representation,
pragmatism will naturally turn to expression (in the sense of process by
which “inner becomes outer”, as in the simple case of a gesture expressing a
feeling). Brandom’s preferred word is explicitation, that is “making explicit
what is implicit.” While he claims that explicitation is conceptualization
of some subject matter, he immediately adds that the implicit may not be
independent of its ways of explicitation:
[S]pecification of what is implicit may depend on the possibility of
making it explicit. And the explicit may not be specifiable apart
from consideration of what is made explicit. On such a view,
what is expressed must be understood in terms of the possibility
of expression. Such a relational expressivism will understand lin-
guistic performances and the intentional states they express each
as essential elements in a whole that is intelligible only in terms
of their relation.91 [Brandom(2001), p. 9]
This sounds very Kantian indeed. Relational expressivism might remind
us of the famous dictum that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions
without concepts are blind.” However, it seems to be a hindrance in the
quest for explaining intentionality in naturalist framework, for the intention-
expression interdependence forms an unbreakable circle.92
Inferentialism understands meaning of a linguistic expression as consisting
of rules of inference.
Grasping the concept that is applied in such a making explicit
is mastering its inferential use: knowing (in the practical sense
of being able to distinguish, a kind of knowing how) what else
one would be committing oneself to by applying the concept,
what would entitle one to do so, and what would preclude such
entitlement. [Brandom(2001), p. 11]
Importantly, the rules of inference can themselves be made explicit by spe-
cific linguistic means. That, according to inferentialism, is the role of logic.
91The first occurence of ‘specification’ in the quotation is to be read very loosely, I
think, otherwise the claim would be trivial, since every specification (in the strict sense of
articulating the differentiae of the species belonging to a genus) is explicit. The question
is what the loose sense is supposed to be. Determination, perhaps?
92No wonder that to break the circle with a one-way oriented explanation, Brandom re-
sorts to pragmatist’s ultimate appeal: an evolutionary story about the origin of normative
social practice from merely differentially responsive creatures’ acts. Sellars offers one such
story in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (recounted here on p. 53).
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Saying “If something is a man, then it is a mammal.” is making explicit the
inferential rule governing the correct use of “man”; it says what we are doing
when saying that someone is a man. Interestingly enough, Brandom describes
such using of logic as promoting “semantic self-consciousness”. Whether this
concept could shed any light on transcendental self-consciousness pursued
here remains to be explored.
4.3 . . . and back again
Now that we have considered various accounts of intentionality, we can turn
our focus back to consciousness.
4.3.1 Fodor and computation
Let’s start with Fodor. His LOT hypothesis coupled with CTM might seem
attractive for anyone trying to provide a naturalist account of mind or con-
sciousness. For it gives a clear idea how the linguistic capacity can be con-
structed. If Fodor is right, then computers can in principle speak (with all
the intricacies traditionally associated with full-fledged language). For those
who believe that consciousness has something to do with language, it is a
good reason to hope that if Fodor’s account is correct, it may also contribute
to the explanation of consciousness. Though I am going to argue that Fodor
and neo-cartesianism do not offer the means to explain transcendental self-
consciousness, I do grant that his project can be easily empirically evaluated
- were we presented with a machine supposedly able to talk, we know how
to verify that.93
Fodor’s metaphysics of mind is quite simple, so we can go through all
alternative theories of consciousness it may allow for. Minds consists essen-
tially of mental states which are relations to symbols - mental particulars.
Let me illustrate it by Fodor’s account of propositional attitudes: to be-
lieve that P is simply to have P in one’s “belief box”, which, metaphysically
speaking, means bearing the relation of believing to a proposition.94 Mental
processes are causal sequences of mental tokens - particular symbols. Fodor
believes that his account has the virtue of explaining, among other things,
the possibility of practical syllogisms. If I have P in my “wanting box” and P
iff Q in my “belief box”, then I act to bring it about that Q. A computation
yielding Q into “to-do box” could only be systematically performed if there
93I will develop the motive of Turing test further below.
94Cf. [Fodor(2008), p. 69] or [Fodor(1987), p. 17].
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is the same intentional object present in my wanting box and belief box (i.e.
P ).95
Could consciousness amount to having some content in “consciousness
box”? Or, to express it in less controversial terms, could consciousness be a
relation to mental tokens, like a special propositional attitude? Yes, but only
in a sense which will not explain what consciousness is, how it arises, what
it requires etc. Consciousness, in the objective sense, is always about some
content (hence objective); thus far, saying that consciousness is a relation to
mental tokens is a trivial statement. But that expresses only what we have
identified, thanks to Kant, as empirical consciousness. For Fodor’s account to
have any relevance for transcendental consciousness, the actual computation
that puts something into consciousness box would have to be explored. For
the rules behind this consciousness-creating computation are what specifies
the condition of possibility of (empirical) consciousness, and thus they would
be the closest Fodorian analogue to transcendental consciousness.
Such an interpretation of transcendental consciousness, however, has gone
quite far from the more literal one I have envisaged. So let me consider
whether the syntactical operation of adding “I think” to P could tell us
anything about the consciousness-creating computation. Meaning of the “I
think” of transcendental consciousness is specific in that it does not make
sense to doubt whether I am actually thinking that P or not. Wittgenstein
draws on the same point when he argues that “I know” in “I know I am
in pain.” is an idle wheel. However, it does make sense to doubt whether
someone else thinks that P or whether I am six feet tall. Therefore the
“I” and “think” of transcendental consciousness must have quite different
sense than in their ordinary use. But Fodor’s atomistic account with well-
behaving compositionality precludes such an option. Certainly, one could
think of a special symbol type whose role would be just this “I think” that can
accompany any mental state; but that would not explain anything. Perhaps,
the idea that consciousness could occur in virtue of a symbol added to a
proposition seems preposterous right from the beginning, and I do not imply
that Fodor might have ever considered it as an explanation. I only wanted
to expose how limited is Fodor’s theory in means to tackle consciousness. In
the end, he probably regards the problem of consciousness insolvable:
Tom Nagel once wrote that consciousness is what makes the phi-
losophy of mind so hard. That’s almost right. In fact, it’s inten-
tionality that makes the philosophy of mind so hard; conscious-
ness is what makes it impossible. [Fodor(2008), p. 22]
95See [Fodor(2008), p. 15].
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Even though I have just argued to the conclusion that the computational
theory of mind built up on LOT fails to provide insights to transcendental
consciousness, it ought not to be inferred that artificial systems like comput-
ers cannot in principle be conscious. I believe that consciousness is an em-
pirical matter and consequently that whether something is conscious or not
can be empirically assessed. The assessment does not require investigation
of internal processes of the thing, after all we deem other people conscious
without checking whether they really have brains.96 Hence, the idea behind
the Turing test can be extrapolated from thinking to consciousness.97
Just to make things clear, the claim that consciousness is an empirical
matter does not imply, I believe, that transcendental consciousness is a phys-
ical feature nor that it is a behavioural aspect. As I have argued at page 23,
transcendental consciousness specifies certain ‘logical’ characteristics of our
understanding that must hold in order for the empirical consciousness to be
possible. We may recognize something as conscious even though we do not
know what makes it conscious. What’s more: we could construct a conscious
thing without being aware of what constitutes the e´lan cognitive.
4.3.2 Dennett, Sellars and their stories
What can we learn about consciousness from neo-behaviourism in general
and Dennett in particular? The emphasis on interactions between the subject
and its environment can supply an account of the selective pressures under
which consciousness has evolved. Understanding the purpose of conscious-
ness, however, may shed only little light on what constitutes consciousness.
Apart from the evolutionary perspective, the subject-environment inter-
action may have a more direct consequence for consciousness, as Dennett
expounds in his Consciousness Explained. There he develops his multiple
drafts model, the core of which is that conscious contents are indeterminate
96However, one could object that looking in other people’s heads is unnecessary because
their having consciousness is a status quo, a null hypothesis of folk psychology, so to speak.
Therefore, we may be able to empirically falsify the null-hypothesis, but never to verify it,
which is as good as real scientific approach. Yet this ‘agnostic solipsism’ may allow that
some ‘systems’ could be assigned consciousness by default if they share with us what is
thought of as indicative of consciousness, e.g. the form of life, linguistic capacity etc. I
am convinced that whatever the indicators are, they manifest behaviourally.
97Turing designed his test as a way of deciding whether machines can think, not whether
they are conscious. But if consciousness manifest overtly and if its presence is not inde-
pendent of its manifestation, then we can imagine how the Turing test could answer even
the query about consciousness. Antecedent of this conditional ultimately turns to the
famous question whether zombies are metaphysically possible (or, to list the reasonable
alternatives, inconceivable sensu stricto, or materially impossible). For the Turing test
idea, see [Turing(1950)].
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until the subject is required to make a specific response to environment.
What we are conscious of is not settled until it is expressed. “There is no
reality of conscious experience independent of the effects of various vehicles
of content on subsequent action (and hence, of course, on memory).”98 In
the end, Dennett attributes special role to linguistic expression among the
effects that determine conscious contents:
Mental contents become conscious not by entering special
chamber in the brain, not by being transduced into some privi-
leged and mysterious medium, but by winning the competitions
against other mental contents for domination in the control of
behavior, and hence for achieving long-lasting effects – or as we
misleadingly say, “entering into memory.” And since we are talk-
ers, and since talking to ourselves is one of the most influential
activities, one of the most effective ways for a mental content
to become influential is for it to get into position to drive the
language-using parts of the controls. [Dennett(1996), pp. 205-
206]
Again, there is no reality of consciousness besides its effects that can manifest
overtly - which is after all what we would expect from neo-behaviourism.
There is a flow of information99 supplied by various discriminators in the
brain. The flow is continuous and undergoes constant revision (hence multiple
drafts model).
Dennett realizes he ought to explain the introspective finding that we
do have conscious thoughts which nevertheless elicit no clear manifestation.
He can offer two replies. First, mental contents (i.e. information, in his
understanding) are conscious to certain degree - there is no non-arbitrary way
to decide what is to count as conscious because consciousness is conceived
of in terms of disposition to (behavioural) expression, or “the competition
for the control of behaviour” in the quotation above. Second, he invokes a
story about internalization of the process of self-probing through language.
Originally, one used language to ask and respond to others (for information,
favours etc.). Eventually, one asked and responded herself to her own benefit
which reinforced the whole process so that it became a habit of inner speech
that we now take to be the stage of consciousness.100
98[Dennett(1991), p. 132].
99Dennett is particularly careful to avoid any claim that would support the interpretation
along LOT lines. Thus speaking of information on his part does not presuppose any
medium of representation; the content of information is specified functionally.
100Cf. [Dennett(1991), p. 195], [Dennett(1996), pp. 195-201].
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Another contribution of the neo-behaviourist paradigm is the possible
significance of the intentional stance to consciousness. If being conscious
of something amounts to ascribing a thought to oneself then we could sur-
mise consciousness originates in adopting the intentional stance to oneself.
Intuitively, however, conscious thoughts differ significantly from thoughts as-
cribed to other subjects. The difference consists not only in the intrinsic
information that conscious thoughts are mine, not someone elses, but more
importantly in that the subject does not have to observe her behaviour in
order to realize what she is conscious of. In other words, the self-ascription
of thoughts is non-inferential. Yet if we buy the premise that the intentional
stance is a predecessor of consciousness (at least in the order of explanation),
we need to understand how the inferential process could become cognitively
direct.
Sellars in his (1956) offers an explanation by telling a story similar but
more complex than the Dennett’s story outlined above. We are to imagine
a community whose members use language to ask favours, express their own
needs and even to make one’s intention-ascriptions explicit (e.g. by saying
“The man over there is hungry.”). It so happens that someone (called Jones
in the story), in observing the intelligent behaviour of his fellows, “develops
a theory according to which overt utterances are but the culmination of a
process which begins with certain inner episodes.”101 Thus folk-psychology
is invented in which thoughts, beliefs, desires etc. are theoretical entities
hypothesised to be inner episodes modelled on language (hence the inner
speech metaphor). So far the story has not brought anything new to the
intentional stance paradigm, except for emphasizing the theoretical status of
intentional vocabulary, which ipso facto implies it could have originated only
through language.102 So, what is needed in order for the folk-psychological
vocabulary, that initially had only theoretical status, to gain a reporting
role? In other words, how does Jones acquire the capacity to report (non-
inferentially) on his occurent thinkings? If the habit of ascription of the
theoretical entities gets established in the community, then one can learn
to report on her beliefs by the trial and error method, provided others will
correct her guesses if the behavioural evidence is to the contrary.103 So
it is the others who posess the original authority of what I believe. This
101[Sellars(1956), §56].
102Sellars insists that “the intentionality of thoughts can be traced to application of
semantical categories to overt verbal performances.”[Sellars(1956), §50] This can be con-
sidered as a reason for classifying this story under the neo-pragmatist label to which
Sellars naturally fits, according to the historical interpretation. While labels don’t matter,
whether Sellars story is related to the intentional stance does.
103Cf. [Sellars(1956), §59].
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counterintuitive result can be mitigated by the following reasoning: it is not
until one learns the basics of self-ascription of thoughts that one can indulge
in the complex stream of thoughts (inner speech) on which she is granted the
full authority. Again, much depends on whether we take the fable to express
a historical story, a stage in children’s mind’s development or elucidation of
logical relations between mind and language.
4.3.3 Brandom and normative scorekeeping
When reading Brandom, one gets the impression that it cannot be stressed
too much how normativity is important to meaning and intentionality. As
Sellars pointed out, one way to understand what normativity of meaning
amounts to is to consider what sentences about meaning actually intend to
express. Saying that “dog” means dog, the four-legged best friend of man, is
not to state a fact about meaning but to indicate what the proper use of the
word is.104 The underlying idea is more subtle than the favourite Wittgen-
steinian line that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”105
For the fundamental, basic thing endowed with meaning is a judgement -
an act of endorsing a claim. Brandom employs the distinction between en-
dorsing and entertaining (a thought, representation etc.), where the latter is
supposed to be an outcome of “subtracting” commitments from the corre-
sponding judgement.106 He notes he thereby follows the work of Kant, for
whom the judgement was the basic act of understanding and a “minimal
unit of responsibility”, and Frege, for whom taking a sentence to be true is
a prerequisite for the derivation of meaning via context principle.107 So, to
mimic the Wittgensteinian line, meaning of a word is its correct use in the
language.108
104The example with dog may be, despite its simplicity, obscuring since one could read
off the normative force as being tightly related to reference: do not use “dog” in a way
that it could not refer to dogs if your judgement is to be true. Perhaps meaning of words
like “fun”, “virtue” or “dull” would serve as better examples in this respect.
105[Wittgenstein(1953), §43].
106Perhaps a clearer insight is provided by the following interpretation of Frege by Bran-
dom: “For him, merely entertaining a proposition is just endorsing various condition-
als in which it appears as antecedent or consequent-and thereby exploring the circum-
stances under which it would be true, and the consequences that would ensue were it
true.”[Brandom(2006), section 2].
107Cf. [Brandom(2006), section 5].
108Obviously, words can be abused (and yet contribute to a meaningful expression) in
respect to their correct meaning, but in that case, the meaning is likely to be parasitic on
the correct use - unlike in case of a mistake when simply a wrong word has been chosen.
Naturally, as language evolves, former cases of abuse can be incorporated as a standard
at next stage.
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Brandom explicates concepts, in line with the Kantian paradigm, as “rules
that express what is a reason for what.”109 Thus concepts determine what
one is committed to when endorsing a judgement articulated by them. Fur-
thermore, while some concepts exhibit a recognitional, non-inferential aspect
(e.g. concepts pertaining more or less directly to sensation), this can be so
only thanks to other concepts being inferentially related to them, which seems
to be a consequence of denouncing the Myth of the given. Now, being aware
of something is bringing it under a concept, thus making a judgement.110
And undertaking the responsibility for the judgement presupposes one keeps
track of what one has committed herself to. In order to take responsibility,
make binding claims, I have to relate the binding force to the transcendental
subject where the commitments are united. Thus the unity of apperception
is qualified as transcendental just for this reason that making a judgement
(apperceiving) presupposes a subject that undertakes the commitments. In
Brandom’s words, “The transcendental unity of apperception is ‘transcen-
dental’ because the sorting of endorsements into co-responsibility classes is a
basic condition of the normative significance of commitments.”111
The requirement for normative scorekeeping on the subject’s part suggests
that one ought to be able to realize what commitment a particular judgement
entails; or, in Brandom’s parlance, make the commitments explicit. This is
enabled by the semantic discourse about meanings.
[B]y using logical vocabulary, I can make explicit the implicit
inferential commitments that articulate the content of the con-
cepts I apply in making ordinary explicit claims. Here the orginal
inferential-propositional model of awareness (in the sense of sapi-
ence) is applied at a higher-level. In the first application, we get
an account of consciousness - for example, that Leo is a lion. In
the second application we get an account of a kind of semantic
self -consciousness. For in this way we begin to say what we are
doing in saying that Leo is a lion.[Brandom(2001), p. 20]
A new thread unfolds here: consciousness as awareness of the meaning
of a judgement. Intuitively, the idea makes little sense as we in our con-
scious thinking are not aware, by introspection, of being preoccupied with
commitments that our thoughts entail. So what sense can we make of the
idea?
109[Brandom(2006), section 6].
110Cf. [Brandom(2001), p. 16].
111[Brandom(2006), section 5].
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We could consider the following. By introspection, we may concede that
the paradigmatic conscious act is the stream of thoughts commonly referred
to as inner dialogue. The dialogic form consists in drawing inferences, argu-
ing against some inferential moves to the consequence of changing a premise,
withholding the conclusion, etc. All the moves in the dialogue can be re-
garded as motivated either by semantic considerations (“A actually means
that I cannot hold both B and C”) or by introducing a premise taken for
granted (“I am convinced that A, so what follows is. . . ”). Semantic con-
siderations help us to decide what judgement we should actually endorse by
disclosing the related commitments, some of which may be worth avoiding.
Since committing oneself is a socially significant act, it is beneficial for the
subject to make an informed choice. That is, before speaking one’s mind,
one should better mind what she’s going to say.
Introspective analyses may perhaps point to other conscious experiences
which do not invole any explicit semantic considerations and could be as-
cribed implicit considerations only with a great stretch of philosophical imag-
ination. This work, however, is not intended to do justice to all species of
conscious experience but to consider features of meaning that may turn out
relevant for transcendental self-consciousness. Now that the features have
been collected, classified and described, we may proceed to the final stand.
5 Conditions of possibility of speaking
Having discussed some features of language related to cognition and con-
sciousness in general, what can we surmise specifically about the relation
between language and transcendental consciousness, which has been identi-
fied as the core of the mind-body problem?
First, let’s discuss the purported unity of consciousness. Consider the
summary by A. Brook:
For Kant, consciousness being unified is a central feature of
the mind, our kind of mind at any rate. In fact, being a single in-
tegrated group of experiences (roughly, one person’s experiences)
requires two kinds of unity.
1. The experiences must have a single common subject.
2. The consciousness that this subject has of represented ob-
jects and/or representations must be unified.
[Brook(2004), section 3.4]
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My aim is to show that both kinds of unity are also preconditions of
speaking a language, or, to put it differently, that being a speaker is sufficient
for meeting the transcendental conditions of consciousness. The requirement
of a single common subject, to which all experience is ascribed, is entailed
in being a speaker thanks to the demand for there to be someone taking
responsibility for judgements, as explained in section 4.3.3. The second kind
of unity is more complicated and Brook defines its sense as follows:
The unity of consciousness =df. (i) a single act of consciousness,
which (ii) makes one conscious of a number of representations
and/or objects of representation in such a way that to be con-
scious by having any members of this group is also to be conscious
by having others in the group and of at least some of them as a
group.[Brook(2004), section 3.4]
The concept of unified consciousness is to account for the transcenden-
tal feature of our experience that we are conscious of a manifold in a single
state of consciousness, and of having distinct conscious experiences in suc-
cession.112 The consciousness of a manifold is, at least in one narrow sense,
entailed by being a speaker in that to understand meaning of a claim, to
employ concepts in a judgement, is to know what are the reasons for it and
what other claims can be inferred from it. The manifold is united, so to say,
thanks to the semantic relations that obtain among the contents of thoughts
and which ought to be apprehended if the subject is to count as a speaker of
meaningful claims.
5.1 The language-consciousness relation
Before I elaborate on these suggestions, let me clarify my view of the relation
between language and consciousness. On the empirical side, I gather that
linguistic capacity is constitutive of consciousness in that becoming able to
speak meaningfully is the very same process by which one becomes self-
conscious in the sense that comprises awareness, personhood and reflexion
. On the logical side, it may be argued that consciousness as a theoretical
concept (or entity) owes its criteria of correct application to (or manifests
itself in) a pattern of linguistic expressions.
112This claim ultimately appeals to our intuition as it cannot be further argued for, given
that we don’t know what the identity of an act of consciousness consists in. Since the fact
is transcendental, we may read it as saying that whatever model of conscious experience we
entertain (e.g. the higher-order theory), it must explain how being conscious of something
entails being conscious of something else.
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There is a variety of kinds of empirical evidence that support the idea
of the constitutive role of language for consciousness. For example, evolu-
tionary stories and arguments can be identified as one such kind. Besides
the general idea that human sapience coevolved with language, the evolu-
tionary paradigm provides the perspective of purpose: for what benefit and
under what selective pressures has consciousness evolved? This perspective
may give us clearer idea what consciousness amounts to in natural terms.
Another kind of evidence draws on consequences of some neurological im-
pairment, such as lesions or brain injuries. There are various cases in which
local brain damage causes aphasia (a kind of impairment of the linguistic
capacity) that support the modular account of the linguistic capacity, for the
aﬄicted aspect of the capacity is localized to the damaged part of the brain
and is considered relatively independent of other aspects. Some aphatics,
especially those who suffer from impairment in the reception of language, ex-
hibit disruptions in their consciousness, such as retrospective confabulation,
in which the subject reports she is not conscious of a stimulus and offers
an unlikely but coherent interpretation of her own past behaviour, which
betrayed some sort of awareness of the stimulus. Most notably, split-brain
patients, whose hemispheres are surgically detached, insist that they are not
conscious of what lies on the left side of their visual field while their be-
haviour (e.g. grasping things manually) shows that the information from
the left visual field is available to other capacities.113 Yet another kind of
evidence may come from psychological studies, ranging from developmental
psychology to psychoanalysis.
No doubt, putting the empirical evidence into the broader philosophical
context is a subtle task that requires a great deal of knowledge in both phi-
losophy and the empirical science concerned. We may settle for the view that
empirical consciousness is causally related to linguistic capacity and take that
as a reason for looking for similarities between language and consciousness
at the transcendental level of their preconditions.
5.2 The speaking subject
I have followed Brandom’s interpretation that the transcendental selfcon-
sciousness is best understood in terms of relating (and so uniting) all com-
mitments one has made by her judgements to a single subject who is respon-
sible for them. Regarding any sentence as an expression of a judgement is
ipso facto thinking of a subject that endorses it and is thus responsible for
demonstrating its truth. When reading novels, we can clearly distinguish
113See [Nagel(1971)].
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between fictional subjects that are committed to different claims: the narra-
tor, various characters, the author. This is to show that the presupposition
of a responsible subject is inherent to the concept of judgement no matter
whether there actually is a physical embodiment of the subject. The concept
of judgement also seems to presuppose there is a community whose members
can hold each other responsible for their claims (and again, the community
may be fictional as well). But taking responsibility for one’s claims is a so-
cial practice that can be learned only from a censorious community using
language. In consequence, wolf-children, or generally people that have never
acquired the ability to communicate judgements in one way or another, are
not self-conscious.114 For those reluctant to accept such a consequence, it
could be the reason to reject this language-oriented interpretation of tran-
scendental self-consciousness; for my part, I agree.
I believe the preceding interpretation conforms to points 2 and 3 men-
tioned in 2.2.1 (p. 22). The subject presupposed by the act of endorsing a
claim is not specified by anything else beyond the act itself, taken abstractly.
The fact that in empirical consciousness one identifies the subject with one’s
body follows from the way the social practice of giving and asking for reasons
is realized: in communication, we address each other’s bodies as these are the
things that express the judgement.115 In the act of synthesis I am conscious
only of that I am insofar I only have to “posit” a subject that endorses the
claim. The same point is made by Cartesian cogito, the difference being only
that where Descartes inferred that the subject is necessarily a thinking thing,
no such specification is appropriate along the transcendental lines.
Yet a crucial question remains unanswered: what makes all the judge-
ments being united in a single subject? From what has been said, it only
follows that each judgement presupposes a subject that takes responsibility
114Thus when reading about Robinson Crusoe, we believe Robinson thinks, makes judge-
ments, because we understand he has acquired this social ability before he shipwrecked
on an island. It would be much less credible, I think, when reading a story about a wolf
child. Significantly, in such stories (e.g. The Jungle Book or Tarzan) the animals are
either depicted as very social or the character exhibits very simple stream of thoughts.
115I don’t intend to imply that our selves are radically different from our bodies. I only
want to emphasize that the identity of the transcendental subject is not constrained by any
specific physical realization (it is, after all, a “logical entity”) though it might necessarily
be bound to some physical realization for the purpose of communication. Considering
once again a talking computer, if its CPU, memory and other functional components
were far away from the peripheries (keyboard, screen, robotic hands etc.), it is likely that
the subject would be localized (by someone adopting the intentional stance) to the place
where it acts, i.e. to the peripheries. Nevertheless, the transcendental subject would not
“change” were the peripheries attached to the functional machinery. Detailed elaboration
of the point can be found in [Dennett(1978)].
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for it, not that the judgements have to be ascribed to one such subject. The
general answer Strawson suggests, namely that it is thanks to our fundamen-
tal consciousness of exercising the power of synthesis, i.e. of judging, does
not itself explain much. Consider, however, that in making a judgement
one commits herself to other claims and justifies the judgement by reasons
which again has to be claims she endorses. I would not endorse the claim
“This is a dog.” if I thought someone else was thereby committed to the
claim “This is a mammal.” If I am to mean it, I have to unite all logically
related judgements to a single subject. Yet again one could object: there
still could be isolated, coherent, self-contained sets of judgements such that
endorsing a claim from one such set is independent of endorsing any claim
from other sets; and how can judgements from different sets be united in
a single subject? The only available answer is then that one is conscious
not only of logical, normative relations but also of individual associations.
For example, I know that something of the thought A made me think B,
though there is no semantic relation between them and I may not be able
to make the association link explicit. Admitedly, however, appealing to a
kind of implicit knowledge of transition from one thought to another is once
again relegating the explanation of unity of transcendental self-consciousness
to some intuitive power that has no clear connection to linguistic capacity.
It is worth contrasting the preceding elaboration of transcendental self-
consciousness with a similar idea which Dennett employs in explaining what
the empirical self is.116 He says self is like a fictional character constituted by
the story of one’s life; he calls the self a center of narrative gravity. Recalling
his intentional stance, the claim may be rephrased as saying that the self is a
unit to which intentions are ascribed, essentially an agent. The point is that
our selves are no less fictional than selves of the others - we create our selves
by the same process of intentional interpretation that we apply to others.
Sometimes the behavioural pattern of an agent is so incongruous that the
best interpretation is positing more selves - as in case of multiple personality
disorder. The analogy with centers of gravity is to show that while selves
are abstract, theoretic entities, they are determined by real things and can
be employed in causal explanations. Unlike Kant, Dennett does not find it
necessary to speak about transcendental self in the attempt to explain or
describe human cognition. He thinks our cognition and conscious, mental
life consists solely in the work of several subsystems whose “intentions” are
united by a retrospective interpretation of my body as an agent. Thus Den-
nett believes only in the theoretical unity of an empirical self or the unity in
the sense of availability to a single cognitive subsystem that may be regarded
as crucial for consciousness, e.g. decision-making or language production.
116See [Dennett(1992)].
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5.3 Speaking of meaning
I am inclined to accept the higher-order theory of empirical consciousness:
to be conscious of some content is to be able to form a higher-order belief
about the content, such as “I think that S.” This is in accord with the
Kantian idea that being conscious of something amounts to conceptualizing
it in the act of synthesis of intuition and understanding, for only something
with a conceptual structure can be part of the higher-order belief. Whether
the higher-order belief must be actually tokened, as a brain state with ap-
propriate representation, or whether one can settle for disposition to cause
tokening of such a higher-order belief, depends on specific ontological con-
straints we put on minds; I will not address these issues.117 Now, what is
crucial for consciousness in entertaining a higher-order belief is not merely
that it is about the nested content, thus rendering it conscious, but more
specifically, that the higher-order belief’s explicit ascription to oneself makes
it more likely that the subject thinks about what it means. That is, psycho-
logically speaking, thoughts of other claims, that are semantically related to
the original one, are more likely to be activated as the subject realizes the
commitments following from endorsing the original thought.
If we leave the transcendental paradigm and enter the psychological one
for a moment, we can argue that various contents acquire different degree
of consciousness depending on the effects on the behaviour of the agent.118
Where there is no overt behaviour to be related to conscious thought, as
in the case of inner speech, we can still consider a language-specific inner
articulation of a thought to be the goal the contents “compete for”. Intu-
itively, the act of inner articulation is derivative from the act of endorsing
a claim in a community, for the stream of inner thoughts ought to, in order
to be of any use for us, meet the demand for coherence as well. That is to
say, criteria of selection of some content to inner articulation are semantic,
among else. What I choose to say to myself, as well as what I say to oth-
ers, depends on meaning. Now, can we accept the preceding intuition and
simultaneously avoid the commitment to a token of a preconceptual message
that is somehow represented in the brain and wished to be articulated? We
can, I think. The stream of thoughts can be generated by semantic consid-
erations aimed to achieve some general discursive goal. For example, I may
have just finished reading a novel that I find rather bad. In the attempt
to make explicit why I consider it a bad novel, I start justifying my judge-
ment by considering various features of which I know that generally make
a novel bad, such as cliche´s, plain characters or badly structured plot. By
117I have partly postponed the discussion to appendix A.
118Cf. Dennett’s idea of competition for behavioural control, see quotation on p. 52.
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introspection, I may find that I go through all these features and ask myself
again if I can justify the claim that they apply to the novel. In effect, by
building up such a justification I am becoming more conscious of the original
thought that the book is bad. Similarly, I can start at a premise and see
what follows from it. Undoubtedly, semantic associations are not the only
psychological mechanism of transition from one thought to another. But the
criteria for the selection to articulation may be essentially semantic. This
requires that the subject has mastered semantic discourse in which one can
argue for the correct use of an expression. As Foucault famously pointed out,
the correctness is relative to a discourse, thus the same linguistic expression
may entail different commitments in different discourses. The subject may
well be aware of these differences and be able to switch from one discourse
to another.119
Now, returning to the transcendental level, our thinking is autonomous
in the sense that we choose what judgement we endorse. Our thinking is
not a simple chain of “blind” associations, but rather a reasoning bound by
the same norms that apply to public claims. Brandom emphasises in his
discussion of Kant that if a subject is to choose what to endorse, what com-
mitment to make, it presupposes that the subject takes the binding norms as
independent of herself. Specifically, taking responsibility for the judgement
“This is a dog.” presupposes that I employ the concept dog in accord with
the norms which govern public usage of “dog”.120 Hence the subject must be
able to make explicit the commitments pertaining to a judgement in order
to decide whether to endorse it or not. This requires the ability of forming
higher-order beliefs expressing semantic relations. Without such an ability
(and its exercise) we could not recognize our thinking as free. For what other
property than meaning could we decide to make a particular judgement? And
if we could not deliberate on meaning and yet our thoughts were associated
on the meaning’s basis, would we not be under the impression that “some-
thing thinks for us” (if we ever stumbled upon this thought thanks to the
semantic engine working in us)? Even though our thinking may be causally
determined by brain processes at the empirical level, at the practical level
we must regard ourselves and each other as free in what we say or think,
since that is already implied by the concept of normativity. It seems to be
a necessary feature of our conscious thinking that it regards itself as free,
which again is a Kantian theme. If that is right, we have a good reason to
119While Foucault sticks to the relativism, others, like Brandom, I think, would argue
that there must be a master discourse in which the implicit internal relations of a discourse
can be made explicit to the benefit that the subject can orient herself in it. Naturally, the
master discourse would be logic.
120See [Brandom(2006), section 9].
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believe that the ability to think about meaning (itself derivative from talking
about meaning) is constitutive of consciousness, for it underlies our choices
of what judgement to endorse, which, to repeat, is the goal for attaining of
which various candidates for conscious thoughts compete.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that the Hard problem consist in explaining transcendental
consciousness: how is the manifold of experience united to a single subject
so that the “I think” can possibly accompany any representation. Following
Kant’s hint that the uniting power is inherent to the synthesis whereby intu-
ition are brought under concepts, and arguing that the conceptual is tightly
linked to the linguistic, I have proposed to look in the domain of philosophy
of language for ideas that could possibly contribute to our understanding of
what constitutes consciousness. The discussion of the nature of meaning,
intentionality, and speaking has indicated that there are striking similarities
between the characteristic features of consciousness and the features recog-
nized in language and its use.
The similarities support the idea that language is constitutive of con-
sciousness. Here is the short explanation of the specific sense that the idea
has acquired in this thesis. Mastering language requires that the speaker
develops the capacity to think about meaning, to deliberate on what to say.
This capacity is very complex and the conditions it entails have direct sig-
nificance for consciousness. One ought to be able to recognize herself as a
subject that takes responsibility for her judgements, and also to bear in mind
the complex of semantic relations of a single judgements to many other judge-
ments, which requires the ability to make the semantic relations explicit in
a higher-order belief. Roughly speaking, the preconditions of consciousness,
revealed by transcendental considerations, are fulfilled by the full-fledged
linguistic capacity. All this converges to the idea that by “minding the lan-
guage”, one becomes conscious - and thus able to speak her mind.
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A Carruthers’s theory of consciousness
P. Carruthers in his (1996) monography puts forward a theory of conscious-
ness that is supposed to combine the best of Fodor, Dennett and various find-
ings from cognitive science. In a nutshell, his theory 1) regards consciousness
in terms of availability for higher-order thoughts which again are reflexively
available to higher-order thoughts; and 2) claims that natural language is
necessarily121 involved, at least in case of human beings, in constituting this
higher-order availability structuring.
Let me mention most of the categories and -isms of philosophy of mind
and language that Carruthers willingly classifies his theory into. First, he
endorses the cognitive conception of language according to which language
is not just a mean of communication but structures our cognition because
we think in it. Second, he agrees with Fodor that thoughts, beliefs or propo-
sitional attitudes in general are to be conceived as relations to internal sen-
tences. Unlike Fodor, however, he does not take it necessary to stipulate
a language of thought for these internal sentences and contends that they
are natural language sentences.122 Third, he is a Fodor-style realist about
mental states: tokens of mental states are tokens of some inner states of phys-
ical organization endowed with causal powers to bring about other mental
states; the pattern of mental state relations, which is deduced by our folk-
psychological reasoning, mimics a pattern of causal relations. See section
4.2.2 here or [Carruthers(1996), 1.6]. Fourth, he believes that the theory of
mind behind our folk-psychological reasoning is largely innate, claiming that
it is the best explanation of striking data from developmental psychology
about how soon and reliably can young children operate on such a theory.
Carruthers makes it clear that he designs his theory to account for the
property of consciousness of mental states, not of self-consciousness or phe-
nomenal consciousness (having states with certain feel to them). However,
he seems to accept the what-it-is-likeness parlance of Nagel and other pro-
ponents of qualia. Still, he employs the concept of phenomenal feel in a way
which suggests that my identification of qualia, in their least controversial
interpretation, with Kantian intuitions is correct. He starts at a thesis he
121Carruthers specifies the necessity as natural, as opposed to conceptual or metaphysical
necessity. In effect, the constitutive character of language for human consciousness is
an empirical matter, not a conceptual one, since it follows from our physical nature,
environment and actual physical laws that obtain. See [Carruthers(1996), sections 1.1,
1.4].
122“When a speaker utters a sentence, on this view, their utterance expresses a thought
by constituting it, not by encoding or signalling it. A hearer who is a competent user
of the same language will then understand that utterance in virtue of it constitutively
expressing, for them, the very same (. . . ) thought.”[Carruthers(1996), p. 2].
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deems uncontroversial: “[F]or there to be conscious experience there must
be something that the experience is like.”123 Next, he observes that knowing
what it is like to be in some state entails being aware of having that state.
Given that the subject may know what it is like for her to be in a state, she
must be able to recognize and distinguish between its experiences as such;
that is, not only the subject can respond differentially to blueberries and
redberries, but she must be able to conceive of the difference between per-
ceptions of blueberries and redberries. Hence, Carruthers infers the necessity
of higher-order thought theory from the starting thesis about phenomenal feel
of conscious experience. This seems to be a strange line of argument. As I
have argued in 2.1.1, I don’t think we can make a good sense of the starting
thesis. Either we have to read “there must be something that the experi-
ence is like” as a strong ontological commitment, which runs into familiar
difficulties, or it is too vague a claim to start an argument with.
Later in the book, however, Carruthers takes on different line, much more
plausible in my opinion: “[P]henomenal feeling will emerge, of natural (per-
haps metaphysical) necessity, in any system where perceptual information
is made available to thought in analogue form, and where the system is ca-
pable of recognising its own perceptual states, as well as the states of the
world perceived.”124 He subsequently notes that not only there are purely
recognitional, non-inferentially applied concepts such as red or loud, but
the awareness of the fact that one has experience as of red is non-inferential
as well.125 Interestingly, he adds: “There might be a natural tendency to
‘carve off’ these recognitional concepts from their surrounding beliefs, and
to use them independently - especially if we find the properties which they
pick out to be of intrinsic interest to us.”126 In Kantian terms, this could be
interpreted as an attempt to strip a perceptual experience of its conceptual-
ization to get a peek at raw intuitions. But that is conceptually impossible;
intuitions cannot be experienced, they are conceptualized. However, if the
craving for experience of raw intuitions is diagnosed as a peculiar philosoph-
ical perversion originating from empirism, we at least know what the fallacy
consists in: in the belief that the recognitional aspect of a concept has some
reality independent of the concept’s functional and causal role. “[T]he prop-
erty of being the subjective feel of an experience of red is a functional one,
123[Carruthers(1996), p. 154].
124[Carruthers(1996), p. 212].
125Theoretically speaking, a system with suitable cognitive architecture (i.e. satisfying
his reflection theory of consciousness yet to be described) “will have the capacity to classify
informational states according to the manner in which they carry their information, not
by inference (. . . ) or description, but immediately.[Carruthers(1996), p. 213].
126ibid.
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identical with possession of a distinctive causal role (the causal role namely,
of being a state whose normal cause is red, and which is present to a reflex-
ive thinking faculty with the power to recognise its own perceptual states
as such).127 Consequently, Carruthers as well as Dennett conclude that the
well-known inverted spectrum thought experiment is idle; my sympathies lie
with them.
In expounding his reflexive theory of consciousness (RT, henceforth), Car-
ruthers employs modules and boxes in the same way as Fodor. Recall that
for Fodor to believe that P is to have P in one’s belief box, which is just
different manner of expressing that the subject bears relation of believing to
a sentence in LOT. Similarly, Carruthers says that being conscious of some-
thing is having that information in one’s ‘conscious box’, or more specifically,
having that information in a short-term memory store such that all informa-
tion there is “available to acts of thinking which are reflexively available
to further thinkings.”128 While schematized as a box, a part of short-term
memory, Carruthers clearly conceives of its identity in functional terms; thus
it is not an unexplained, stipulated black box, but rather a cognitive com-
ponent that exhibits the quoted feature. It is his sententialism (see second
and third characteristic of his theory at the beginning) which implies that
the component must be conceived of as a special container for sentences. We
can, however, refrain from endorsing any specific stance like sententialism,
realism about the mental etc., and consider only the functional role of the
component.
I think the functional specification Carruthers offers points in the right
direction, so let me elaborate on it. He classifies his RT as a species of that
gender129 of higher-order thoughts theory of consciousness which states:
Any mental state M , of mine, is conscious = M (level 1) is
disposed to cause an activated belief that I have M (level 2),
which in turn is disposed to cause the belief that I have such
a belief (level 3), and so on; and every state in this series, of
level n, is disposed to cause a higher-order belief of level n + 1.
[Carruthers(1996), p. 174]
127[Carruthers(1996), p. 214].
128[Carruthers(1996), p. 194].
129Carruthers recognizes four alternative higher-order theories based on variations along
two dimensions. The first dimension concerns whether higher-order beliefs must be ac-
tually physically tokened in order to be conscious of the subject matter of the belief or
whether there just ought to be disposition for their tokening. The second dimension con-
cerns the question whether higher-order beliefs are themselves conscious. His RT theory
belongs to the alternative which lets the mental state be only disposed to cause a higher-
order belief and requires them to be conscious too.
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Crucially, the recursive account of consciousness does not entail infinite
regress because what matters is the disposition of a state to cause token-
ing of a belief that I am in such state. Furthermore, the higher-order belief
must itself be so disposed; thus it does not suffice merely to have a mental
state that is about another (hence lower-order) mental state - unless the for-
mer is disposed to be reflected on. It is obvious why language fits nicely in
this scheme, for the recursive character is attained by a simple syntactical
operation of prefixing the original sentence with “I think”. But the triv-
ial ‘logical’ disposition of sentences qua linguistic abstractions (i.e. not as
mental tokens) for such syntactical extension does not ensure that every sen-
tential mental state will be disposed to cause some higher-order state. Only
the right ones will be, the conscious ones; we do, after all, experience strange
moments of articulating some meaningful linguistic expression (mostly in a
kind of inner speech or quiet muttering) without being aware of it. So lin-
guistic expression is not sufficient for consciousness, according to Carruthers.
It is, however, naturally necessary for it in the following sense:
Some human conscious thinking is such that, of natural neces-
sity, it involves public language (in virtue of the given architecture
of human cognition, together with causal laws); and, necessarily,
some of these propositional thoughts belong to types which (for us
at least) constitutively involve such language.[Carruthers(1996),
p. 263]
To complete the picture, Carruthers has it that the folk-psychological
module of our cognition enables us to conceptualize our occurent thinkings,
although we are aware of what we think non-inferentially, unlike in case
of other minds. In other words, the classificatory concepts like thought,
belief or desire come from the cognitive module responsible for our implicit
theory of mind.130 One has to possess these concepts in order to reflect on
her own thinkings, i.e. to be aware of her own thoughts, beliefs, etc.
130That it is a relatively independent module and not an acquired and culture-dependent
theory, like “folk literary theory”, is presumably substantiated by early signs of the theory
working in young children’s behaviour, much earlier that they master the language in a way
sufficient for learning the theory explicitly. Admittedly, the evidence from developmental
psychology may not be as conclusive as interpreted above, but still we can at least agree
that we are born predisposed to master folk-psychological reasoning. Anyway, it does not
follow that the folk-psychological concepts ought to be ready for use in minds of wolf-
children - probably being exposed to social interaction is necessary for the concepts to get
established in one’s mind. On the other hand, it seems to follow that the concepts would
be in force in cognition of someone who does not speak any language, yet who has not
been deprived of social interaction and whose mental condition is not severely impaired
(if such a situation is conceivable at all).
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Interestingly, as Carruthers needs to allow that both conscious and un-
conscious thinking involves natural language, he resorts to imply that it is
phonological articulation (presumably in one’s auditory imagination) what
grants access to thought’s content by higher-order thoughts.
My hypothesis is that it is by formulation some of our occurrent
thinkings in the form of images of natural language-sentences
that our cognitive system is able to gain access to (in such a
way as to render conscious) its own processes of thought. The
function of the phonological loop is thus much more than just
to enable the system to engage in language-involving processing
tasks. It is also to enable the system to gain access to its own
occurrent thoughts, thus facilitating the sort of indefinite self-
improvement that comes with self-awareness. And according to
RT theory the sentences represented in the phonological loop of-
ten are the acts of thikning the thoughts wihch are expressed by
those sentences.[Carruthers(1996), p. 247]131
In reply to a hypothetical objection from advocates of LOT that any
thought in natural language might be ipso facto conscious and that thinking
as well as language production presuppose merely conceptual (not yet artic-
ulated) level of representation, Carruthers appeals to purely semantic level
of language expressions - like lemma level of an entity of mental lexicon in
psycholinguistics, or logical form in Chomskian framework.132 One unconc-
sciously thinks, as it were, at this semantic level free of vocalization, that
nevertheless is bound to a specific language. This opens a huge debate as to
what exactly this semantic or conceptual level is supposed to be. Although
it is conceivable that experiments may be designed such that would test the
hypothesis that the conceptual is (native) language-specific, it nevertheless
blurs the dividing line between LOT and RT theory of consciousness, since
both operate with representation in a medium that is semantically evaluable
and to a great extent abstract. I am actually inclined to believe that some
such level of representation has to be inevitably presupposed if we attempt to
naturalize consciousness. Likewise I believe that meaning of such represen-
tations ought to be derivative from meaning of their articulated expressions.
131The phonological loop is a part of ‘working memory’ model presented first by A.
Baddeley a G. Hitch in their 1974 article ‘Working Memory’, in The Psychology of Learning
and Motivation, vol. 8, ed. G. Brown, Academic Press.
132Cf. [Carruthers(1996), pp. 249,267].
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